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Article 5

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
of the College of Law, former Procurator and Advocate of the Tribunal
of the Apostolic Signatura and of the Sacred Roman Rota; Mr. Mortimer J. Adler, Professor of Philosophy of Law, University of Chicago;
Mr. Harold R. McKinnon, of the San Francisco bar; and Mr. Ben W.
Palmer, of the Minneapolis bar.

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-WHITE PRIMARIES As A LEGAL DEVICE

FOR

DISFRANCHISING NEGROES IN THE SOUTH.-A crippling blow and, it

is hoped, one that may be fatal was dealt to the "white primary"--the
most effective modern device for disfranchising Negroes-by the decision of the U. S. District Court in the case of George Elmore v. Clay
Rice et al.,1 which upheld the right of the plaintiff, a Negro, to vote in
a Democratic primary in South Carolina. In his forceful and realistic
opinion Judge J. Waties Waring pointed out that South Carolina is the
only remaining state which now conducts a primary election solely for
whites and stated that, "It is time for South Carolina to rejoin the
union. It is time to fall in step with the other states and to adopt the
American way of conducting elections."
In 1944, in a vain attempt to avoid just such a decision as was
given in the Elmore case, the then governor of the state of South Carolina, Olin D. Johnson (now the United States Senator from this state),
issued a proclamation calling for an extraordinary session of the legislature to repeal all the statutes relating to the state regulation of primaries, so that advocates of white supremacy in primaries could maintain that no Negro was deprived of his rights by any state action. Consequently the federal courts would have no jurisdiction. At this session of the legislature the governor stated:
The Attorney General's Office, with the assistance of the
Solicitors of this State, have been working diligently for several days upon the matter of finding all primary laws upon the
statute books that must be repealed so that we might have a
free, white Democratic primary which can nominate its candidates free and untrammeled without legislative sanction.
After these statutes are repealed, in my opinion, we will
have done everything within our power to guarantee white
supremacy in our primaries of our state insofar as legislation
is concerned. Should this prove inadequate, we South Carolinians will use the necessary methods to retain white suprem1 72 F. Supp. 516 (1947).
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acy in our primaries and to safeguard the homes and happiness of our people.
White supremacy will be maintained in our primaries. Let
the chips fall where they mayl 2
This action on the part of the governor was prompted by a decision

of the U. S. Supreme Court in the case of Smith v. Allwright 3 in which

the petitioner, a Negro citizen of Texas, brought an action for damages
against respondents, election and associate election judges of his pre-

cinct, because they deprived him of a ballot in the primary election
held for the purpose of choosing Democratic candidates for the United
States Senate and House of Representatives, as well as state officials.
Relief was denied by the District Court and this decision was affirmed
by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on the authority
of Grovey v. Townsend.4 Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court
to resolve questions raised as to inconsistency between the decisions in

Grovey v. Townsend and United States v. Classic et al.5 It was held
that when primaries are a part of the machinery for choosing state and
national officers, the same tests to determine the character of discrimination or abridgement should be applied to the primaries as are applied
to the general election, and the citizen's participation in the primaries
is protected from abridgement under the principle of the Fifteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
This was the fourth time that the Supreme Court had decided a
case involving the question of Negro participation in the Texas Democratic primaries. In the first case 6 the court declared a statute unconstitutional which provided that "in no event shall a Negro be eligible to
participate in a Democratic party primary election." In the second
case 7 the court (in a five to four decision) declared unconstitutional a
subsequent statute which provided that "every political party" shall
have the right to "prescribe the qualifications of its own members."
The third case, that of Grovey v. Townsend,8 held that action taken
barring Negroes from a Democratic primary was merely refusal of
membership in a voluntary organization and could not be regarded as
state action prohibited by the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.
However, as was stated previously, this case was expressly overruled in
the case of Smith v. Allwright.
72 F. Supp. at page 520 (1947).
3 321 U. S. 649, 64 Sup. Ct. 757, 88 L. Ed. 987 (1944).
4 295 U. S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed. 1292 (1935).
5 313 U. S. 299, 61 Sup. Ct. 1031, 85 L. Ed. 1368 (1931).
6 Nixon v. Herndon et al., 273 U. S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446, 71 L. Ed. 759
(1927).
7 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73, 52 Sup. Ct. 484, 76 L. Ed. 984 (1932).
8 295 U. S. 45, 55 Sup. Ct. 622, 79 L. Ed. 1922 (1935).
2
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Following the case of Smith v. Allwright, Louisiana and Texas as
well as South Carolina immediately repealed all their white primary
provisions, whereas Florida, Alabama, and Georgia came to the same
result by reason of further court rulings. 9 But the voluntary repeal
of these statutes was not in pursuance of securing civil liberties; rather
it was done on the theory that by placing the primaries entirely outside the law and the structure of government the ruling in Smith v.
Allwright would be rendered inapplicable.
Since the state of South Carolina had repealed all laws regulating
primaries, counsel for the defense in the F2more case argued in their
briefs that:
It is universally established by all the authorities that this
Court has jurisdiction only if he has been deprived of his
right by some State action. He must show further, as was indicated in the Classic and in the Smith v. Allwright cases, that
the defendants in the respects complained of, were acting
"under color of" some State statute or law. The Federal
Courts have no jurisdiction over the private controversies
among citizens, or even over controversies by a Negro claiming discrimination against him by some private person or
corporation, in the absence of some State statute authorizing
such discrimination.
However, the court in the case summarily disposed of this argument of the defendants, holding:
It is true that the General Assembly of the State of South
Carolina repealed all laws relating to and governing primaries, and the Democratic Party in this State is not under statutory control, but to say that there is any material difference
in the governance of the Democratic Party in this State prior,
and subsequent to 1944, is pure sophistry. The same membership was there before and after, the same method of organization of club meetings, of delegates to County Conventions,
delegates to State Conventions, arranging for enrollment,
preparation of ballots, and all the other details incident to a
primary election.
The argument of the defendants in the Elmore case that the primaries constituted a voluntary association in the nature of a private
club and as such had unlimited choice of membership, although utterly
ridiculous, is by no means novel, since it was the basis of the opinion
in the case of Grovey v. Townsend. Perhaps it is not too optimistic
to hope that other courts will have the courage demonstrated by Judge
Waring in the Elmore case to point out the fallacy of such an argument.
9 The Report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights, To Secure These

Rights, Pages 36-37.
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The Elmore case is at present on appeal in the Fourth U. S. District
Court of Appeals, where attorneys for the defense made the point that
the defendants cannot be charged with discriminating against Negroes
because some of the membership restrictions also exclude whites. A
Washington newspaper which covered the appeal reported the following testimony:
"How do you manage to discriminate against the white
people?" asked Judge Morris A. Soper.
"We wouldn't take any Republicans or Communists or
any people like that," replied Belser.
"Could you exclude women, lawyers, soldiers, veterans,
bowlegged men-anybody you want?" asked Judge Armistead
Dobie at another point.
"That's right," said Belser.10
Perhaps the solution to this problem lies in acting upon one of the
recommendations from President Truman's Committee on Civil Rights,
which demands, "The enactment by Congress of a statute protecting
the right to qualify for or participate in Federal or State primaries or
elections against discriminatory action by state officers based on race
or color or depending on any other unreasonable classification of persons for voting purposes."
John M. Anderton

LABOR LAW-THE EFFECT OF THE PORTAL TO PORTAL ACT ON THE
FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT.-When the Eighth Congress enacted
the so-called Portal to Portal Pay Act, it did so, presumably, to alleviate the monstrous burden suddenly thrust upon employers and the
government by labor's land rush to stake out claims upon management under the decision of the now famous Mt. Clemens Pottery case.,
In his original decision,2 Judge Picard of the Federal District Court of
Michigan held that certain "clocking-in" time prior to the stipulated
hour of work commencement was compensable under the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938.3 Upon appeal, 4 the United States Supreme
Court admitted that such claims could be compensable under the F. L.
S. A., but pointed out the possible application of the de minimus doctrine. Judge Picard then felt "mandated" to dismiss the complaint of
10 The Washington Post, Page 2, November 19, 1947.
1 Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U. S. 690, 90 L. Ed. 1515,
S. Ct...... (1946).
2 60 F. Supp. 146 (E. D. Mich., 1943).
3 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U. S. C. A. § 1 et seq. (1938) (as amended).

4

328 U. S. 690, 90 L. Ed. 1515, ...... S. Ct .......

(1946).
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the pottery workers, although he expressed sympathy for the original
plaintiffs in that action. 5 The door, however, stood ajar.6 Through it
flooded the 1,913 portal to portal cases filed in the federal courts, with
aggregated claims of some $6,000,000, between July 1, 1946, and January 31, 1947.7
Apparently, under a cost-plus contract the government would be
liable to make whole an employer subjected to such claims. Congress,
viewing with alarm the possible results to its expenditure reduction
program, and acting upon a request from President Truman, set out to
rectify the situation. It was not impressed by a judicial application of
the de minimus rule. Some far more stringent regulatory measure
was needed, and at once. Congress wanted to outlaw any possible
claims brought under any sort of portal to portal activity. It felt that
the portal to portal claims were a type of action which interfered with
the free flow of interstate commerce; such suits would be a serious
drain upon industry and the government at a time when full production was an absolute necessity to avoid further inroads by an incipient
inflation.8
Labor had opened the Pandora's Box presented to it by the Supreme
Court. What came out of that box was a far more stringent measure
than the portal to portal cases themselves would seem to have called
for. The question, then, presents itself: "Was it the intent of Congress not merely to outlaw portal to portal pay suits, but to impair
the operative effect of the entire F. L. S. A., by repealing by implication pertinent provisions thereof?" It seems that it may well have
been.
Under Section 2 of the Portal to Portal Act, Congress provides, in
effect, that no employer shall be subject to any liability under the F.
L. S. A. on account of the failure of such employer to pay an employee
minimum wages or overtime compensation for any activity engaged in
prior to the enactment of the statute (Portal to Portal) except an activity which was compensable either by an express provision of a written or unwritten contract in effect at the time of such activity, or by
a custom or practice in effect at the time of such activity at the establishment where the employee was employed, covering such activity, not
inconsistent with a written or non-written contract then in effect.
Furthermore, an activity shall be considered compensable under such
5 69 F. Supp. 710 (E. D. Mich., 1946).
"It cannot be said that the Mt. Clemens case did more than open additional doors for added compensation which neither party had contemplated . . 21
Burfeind v. Eagle-Picher Co. of Texas, 71 F. Supp. 929, 930 (N. D. Tex., 1947).
7 Sen. Rep. No. 37, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) 2.
8 Part I, "Findings and Policy,". ..... Stat ........ 29 U. S. C. A. § 261 et seq.
(1947).
6
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a contract provision only when it was engaged in during the portion
of the day with respect to which it was so made compensable.
These provisions clearly outlaw actions based upon "gate-walking"
time. But they go much further than that. Suppose that an employer contracts with his employees that the employees shall be on the
premises from 7:30 a. m. until 5:30 p. m. with an hour off for lunch,
but it being also expressly provided that only the time from 8:00 a. m.
on shall be compensable. Under the aforementioned provision, the
employee cannot recover overtime compensation for the additional halfhour. Not only has he no contract by the terms of which he can recover, but he has an express contract by the terms of which he cannot.
No custom or practice would be of assistance to him, because it would
be inconsistent with the contract.
Such a situation is not inconceivable. This act affects not only the
organized workers, who presumably have a modicum of bargaining
power, but it also affects the millions of unorganized workers who must
deal at arm's length with the employer. Economic coercion is far
from being a thing of the past. Furthermore, if the employee must
depend upon a custom or practice of the establishment, such custom
or practice is the creature of the employer. A proposed amendment
to make the provision read, "'lawful' custom or practice," introduced
by Representative Kefauver (D. Tenn.) both in the committee and on
the floor was both times defeated. 9 It is possible to see how an unscrupulous employer who engages in unfair practices might have an
advantage over an honest employer under these provisions of the
Act.' 0
9 93 Cong. Rec., Feb. 27, 1947, at 1562; 93 Cong. Rec., Feb. 28, 1947, at 1628.
10 ". . . there is one class of legitimate claims to which we have not yet given
the immunity to which they are entitled, that is the case of the claim based upon
custom and practice in the industry generally. We were given the instance of a
case where some men moved from New York into northern Pennsylvania and
started making shirts. The girls they employed to make the shirts were required

to put in little piles the various cut-out parts of the shirts, the left arm, the front
of the shirt, and the back, and the right arm, and the collar before they started
sewing. The employer established the practice in a time of depression that he
would not pay those girls for the time they were putting those items into separate
piles but would start their pay only when they actually started their needles.
This was contrary to the general custom and practice in the industry and it was
contrary, it seems to me, to fundamental fairness and right. Such a situation, it
seems to me, should not give an employer immunity. If this language were
broadened to say also an action could be maintained in the case of a custom or
practice in the industry, then we would give protection to an employee who was
being overreached and at the same time would give protection to the vast bulk
of honest, honorable employers who do not try that kind of abuse and are subject to unfair competition from those who do . . . Rep. Keating (R., N. Y.)
93 Cong. Rec., Feb. 27, 1947, at 1566.

"....Another part of this bill which concerns me deeply is this definition of
custom and practice. I understand the Supreme Court has defined work as
'physical or mental exertion controlled or required by the employer and pursued
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Section 3 of the Act provides that hereafter any cause of action
under the F. L. S. A. may be compromised, if there exists a bona fide
dispute as to the amount payable by the employer to his employee (in
the absence of fraud or duress) except not to the extent that such compromise is based on an hourly wage rate less than the minimum provided by that Act. This provision likewise has dangerous implications.
The employer, by compromising the issue of the number of hours
worked, rather than the rate per hour, could settle for an amount in
effect less than the amount required under present minimum wage provisions. For example, if the employee claimed that he was entitled to
compensation for fifty hours overtime, worked at sixty cents per hour,
or a total of thirty dollars, and the employer, who claimed that he had
only worked thirty hours, finally settled with him for forty hours, or
twenty-four dollars, it would amount to the same thing as paying an
employee forty cents an hour for overtime. Here again, economic
pressure could make the employee more prone to accept the compromise
than to risk losing his employment. It would be difficult to prove
coercion in a case like this.
Section 9 of the Act provides that as to claims arising prior to this
Act no employer shall be subject to any liability for his failure to pay
minimum wages or overtime compensation under the F. L. S. A., if he
pleads and proves that he acted in good faith in conformity with and
in reliance on any administrative regulation or ruling of any agency
of the United States. This provision is so all inclusive that it absolves
practically all employers who relied upon anybody at all, provided they
can prove it, from any liability under the F. L. S. A. Congress could
not have intended this provision to mean merely that they are exempted from liquidated damages provided for by the F. L. S. A., since
there is a special provision in the Portal to Portal Act covering those
damages.
As to future claims, Section 10 provides that employers will be exempted from having to pay claims arising under the F. L. S. A. if
they can show that they relied upon or conformed with any order of
the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division. As to either past
or future rulings the employer's exemption exists even though such
rulings are later modified, rescinded, or determined by judicial authornecessarily and primarily for the benefit of the employer.' Now, I do not think
that particular definition is complete. I wish that there were an attempt in this
bill to give us a little better definition than that. I submit to you that to substitute 'custom and practice' for this Supreme Court definition is certainly taking
a step backwards. . . I hope that an amendment is offered to eliminate the
language contained in the section which uses the words 'custom or practice.' It in
effect substitutes it for the present interpretation of 'work' by the Supreme Court.
If it were the custom or practice for an employer to pay for only a part of the
week's work, this practice would be acceptable under this law. A new employer
would be free to rewrite the law to suit himself ... " Rep. Holifield (R., Calif.)
93 Cong. Rec., Feb. 27, 1947 at 1569.
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ity to be of no legal effect. No matter how unjust, or how unconscionable such ruling might be, if an employer relied in good faith upon
the ruling, he would be exempted from paying claims which he would
have had to pay had he not so relied. No matter how worthy the
claim of an employee may be, these provisions in the Act could bar
his recovery of wages justly earned.
Section 11 provides that if the employer shows to the satisfaction
of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such claim was in
good faith, or that he had reasonable grounds for believing that it was
not a violation of the F. L. S. A., the court, in its discretion, might
award no liquidated damages or may award any amount thereof not to
exceed the amount specified in Section 16(b) of that Act. 1 This provision does not require that the employer have acted in reliance upon
any administrative ruling. Of and by itself, without regard to previously noted sections, this section provides the forceps, if it does not
pull the teeth of the F. L. S. A.
Even if the provisions of Sections 9 and 10 were meant to refer only
to liquidated damages, and not to minimum wages and overtime compensation, the liquidated damage provision of the F. L. S. A. is struck
down. This is an open invitation to an unscrupulous employer to attempt to violate the F. L. S. A., since all he would be required to pay
is the minimum wage rates for which the services have actually been
rendered. These he can probably compromise, as indicated above.
Section 6 sets up a statute of limitations. Any cause of action
accruing on or after the date of this Act must be brought within two
years; any cause of action accruing prior to the enactment must be
brought within two years or within the period specified by the applicable state statute, whichever is the shorter, or be forever barred. Here
again, the unorganized worker bears the brunt of the Act. The organized worker is usually informed of his rights, and can protect them,
but the unorganized worker is left in a defenseless position.' 2 The
unorganized worker has no knowledge of the complicated legal problems involved; he usually keeps no record of the hours worked, and
cannot compute the overtime to which he is entitled; he usually has no
knowledge of how his employer's business is conducted. Furthermore,
the burden of proof is upon the employee; even if he knew how to
gather sufficient evidence on which to base an action, it would take
him so long that the statute would have run against a portion, at least,
of his claim. There is no provision in the Act which prevents the
11 "16(b). Any employer who violates the provisions of Secs. 6 or 7 of this
act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their
unpaid minimum wages or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may
be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages. ....
13-15
12 See generally, H. R. Rep. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947)
(Minority views).
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statute from running while the employee is engaged in compromise negotiations with his employer. The House bill carried a provision for
a one-year statute. The House voted down amendments to change it
to two or three years. But even some of the Republicans in the House
supported the amendments. The Senate amended the bill to provide the
two-year statute. But, as has been shown, this is still not long enough.
Section 5 of the Portal to Portal Act provides that the second sentence of Section 16(b) of the F. L. S. A. is amended to read as follows:
Action to recover such liability may be maintained in any
court of competent jurisdiction by any one or more employees
for and in behalf of himself or themselves and other employees
similarly situated. No employee shall be a party plaintif
to any such action unless he gives his consent in writing to
become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in
which the action is brought.
This provision bans representative actions. It tightens the stricture
of the section imposing a two-year statute of limitations by rendering
it necessary to search for employees having possible claims who have
left the employment involved. Under the F. L. S. A. representative actions were permitted. Here again, this Act goes beyond portal to
portal actions and strikes down claims in no way related to those actions.
It is not beyond argument that Congress was unduly alarmed about
the enormity of the portal to portal claims filed after the Mt. Clemens
decision. Congress acted before the courts had applied the de minimus
rule to those claims. De minimus might well have thrown out the
unworthy claims. The worthy claims should in justice be protected.
At any rate, Congress seems to have gone much further than merely to
eliminate unjust portal to portal claims. The Act itself makes no distinction between portal and non-portal claims.
There has not yet been time for the Act to come fairly before the
courts for interpretation. One federal court in Texas 13 has upheld
the constitutionality of the Act in its general import. It was there
held that Congress could withdraw the right of the courts to proceed
with suits based upon rights created by legislation. The claims under
the F. L. S. A. are not "vested property rights," but are simply statutory rights that can be withdrawn by Congress at any time.
There are other serious considerations. As noted above, the employer is permitted to rely on administrative rulings even though a
court later rules them invalid. The Supreme Court may consider thfs
to be an invalid delegation of judicial power to an administrative
agency. It may be that the Court will be unwilling to construe this
Act as a cure-all for employers' lack of past compliance with the F. L.
13

Burfeind v. Eagle-Picher Co. of Texas, 71 F. Supp. 929 (N. D. Tex., 1947).
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S. A. The Court may feel that if Congress had intended to destroy
such a keystone of social legislation it would have said so. While as 14a
general proposition, Congress may abrogate purely statutory rights,
it may be that the relief afforded must have a reasonable relation to
the legitimate end to which the legislation is directed. 15 If the legitimate end of this Act is relief from outrageous portal to portal claims,
many of its sweeping provisions affecting the F. L. S. A. may have no
reasonable relation to the "legitimate end."
By way of preamble, Congress has set out a section entitled "Findings and Policy." After an enumeration of the abuses of unjust portal
to portal claims and dire forebodings of more abuses to follow, Congress
sets out its policy: 16
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Congress in
order to meet the existing emergency and to correct existing
evils, 1) to relieve and protect interstate commerce from practices which burden and obstruct it; 2) to protect the right of
collective bargaining; and 3) to define and limit the jurisdiction of the courts. (emphasis supplied).
The President, in his message approving the Act, voiced the hope
that the F. L. S. A. would noi suffer abrogation.
I am confident that the purpose of the main provisions of
the Act is to eliminate the immense potential liabilities which
have arisen as the result of the portal to portal claims. It is
not the purpose of the Act to permit violations of our fundamental wage and hour standards, or to allow a lowering of
7
those standards.'
It is certainly to be hoped that the President's high note of optimism
is not ill-founded. While it is still theoretically possible to maintain
an action under the F. L. S. A., for a liability arising either upon an
express contract or upon custom or practice of the establishment, certain provisions of the Act are shown to be such that they violate the
In Re Hall, 167 U. S. 38, 17 S. Ct. 723, 42 L. Ed. 69 (1897).
Treigle v. Acme Homestead Association, 297 U. S. 189, 56 S. Ct. 408, 80
L. Ed. 575 (1936).
16 Part I, Sec. 1 (b).
"... The statement is made in section one that these laws 'have been and are
being administered and interpreted in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and agreements between employers and employees, with results that are
described as threatening the entire fabric of the American economy and jeopardizing the function of the government. This is an astonishing assertation. If the Congress which enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 had not intended antisocial practices of certain types of employers in dealing with their employees to
be replaced by minimum fair labor standards, that Congress would not have
passed the law ... " Rep. Norton (D., N. J.) 93 Cong. Rec., Feb. 27, 1947, at
1557.
17 93 Cong. Rec., May 14, 1947, at 5418.
14

15
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spirit, if not the letter of the F. L. S. A. But the Court may look to
the cause of this legislation (the multitudinous portal to portal claims),
and, weighing the policy clause above quoted, find the intent of Congress to be only to correct those evils, and not to destroy the F. L. S.
A., as might be done by a too literal interpretation of this Act.
B. M. Apker and J.V. Wilcox

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" CONCEPT IN

EDUCATION-A LEGAL FALLACY.-Several cases are now pending in

which a qualified Negro applicant is seeking to obtain admittance to a
state-supported graduate or professional school which is maintained exclusively for white students.' Indirectly, the basic question of racial
segregation is involved in each of these cases, but it is only in the Texas
case of Sweatt v. Painter2 that segregation in education is attacked as
an illegality per se.3 That case presents the direct question of whether
or not segregation violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, regardless of the provision of "equal" educational institutions for each of the two races.
The "separate but equal" theory had its national origin in the famous federal case of Plessy v. Ferguson.4 The majority of the court in
that case held that statutes requiring public carriers to separate their
passengers according to a racial classification did not violate the Four1 Sweatt v. Painter, Case No. 9684, in the Court of Civil Appeals for the
Third Supreme Judicial Court of Texas; Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma,
-

Okla.

-, 180 P. 2d) 135 (1947); Wrighten v. University of South Carolina,

72 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. S. C., 1947).
2 Sweatt v. Painter, supra. This was an action for mandamus against the
authorities of the University of Texas to require them to admit the plaintiff, a
qualified applicant except as to race. The 126th District Court of Travis County
entered an order that the action of the defendants violated the Constitution of the
United States but gave the defendants six months in which to establish an equal
school for Negroes. In December, 1946, the lower court refused to issue the
writ of mandamus. On appeal the court set aside the ruling of the trial court
and remanded the cause. The trial court heard the case and entered final judgment with costs against the plaintiff and the case is now pending appeal in the
Civil Court of Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District of Texas.
3 Sweatt v. Painter, supra note 1; Sipuel v. University of Oklahoma, ......
Okla .....
180 P. (2d) 135, 137 (1947). ".. . it is not wholly clear whether petitioner
seeks to overturn the complete separate school policy of the state, or seeks to compel equal facilities for the races by obtaining an extension of such facilities to indude a separate law school for negroes."
Wrighten v. University of South Carolina, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E. D. S. C.:
1947). The issue was not raised in the pleadings and at the pre-trial conference
by agreement of the counsel the validity of segregation was omitted from the
issues.
4 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).

NOTES
teenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution so long as equal facilities were available to each race. Since that decision, which gave a
judicial interpretation to a legal concept conceived in the era following
the War Between the States, the courts have assumed, or tacitly admitted, that racial segregation in state-supported schools was not a violation of the Constitution of the United States. In that decision the
court discussed the problem of segregation in schools but, since that was
not the issue in the case, whatever may have been said would not be
directly binding upon a court considering the specific issue of the validity of a state law requiring segregation in public schools. Upon the
whole issue of segregation, the great southern judge, Mr. justice Harlan,
prophesied in his dissent: "In my opinion, the judgment this day
rendered will, in time, prove quite as pernicious as the decision made
in the Dred Scott case." Although this decision adopted the view that
racial segregation on public carriers was not a denial of equal protection of the laws, the decision has since been qualified to exclude those
public carriers engaged in interstate commerce. 5
It is worthy of note that the question of segregation as raised In
Plessy v. Ferguson,was based upon a demurrer to the pleadings. Factual evidence of the unreasonableness of segregation in actual practice
was not in the record. In the Sweatt case, now pending appeal, evidence was offered concerning the historical and sociological results of
the theory in actual practice in Texas. An expert witness was produced and his testimony as to the quality and quantity. of the opportunities furnished under the segregated system was reiected as being
irrelevant. The Court of Appeals will decide if the plaintiff can raise
the issue of whether or not the education furnished is equal to that
furnished in schools provided for white students. Thus the whole
system of segregation 6 will be put in issue in a clear case which may
5 Morean v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 328 U. S. 373. 66 Sup. Ct. 10g0,
90 L. Ed 1317 (1946). The court held that racial segregation imposed upon interstate carriers was an undue burden upon interstate commerce. See note in 22
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6 "Segregation and discrimination have had material and moral effect on
whites, too. Booker T. Washington's famous remark that the white man could no.
hold the Negro in the gutter without getting in there himself, has been corroborated by many white southern and northern observers. Throughout this book.
we have been forced to notice the low economic, political, legal and moral
standard of Southern whites - kept low because of discrimination against Negroes
and because of obsession with the Negro problem." Gunnar Myrdal, AN A.MER1cA" Du.msm, Vol. I, 644 (1944).
"The laws prescribing racial segregation are based upon the assumption that
racial minorities can be segregated under conditions that are legally valid if not
discriminating. Theoretically, segregation is merely the separate but equal treatment of equals. In such a complex and open society as our own, this is, of course.
nether possible nor intended; for whereas the general principle of social regulation
and selection is based upon individual competition, special group segregation
within the broad social framework must be effected artificially and by the im-
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reach the United States Supreme Court. The question will then be
whether the court will abolish or evade the Constitutional guarantees
under the guise of legal technicality or whether it will hold that the
Constitution of the United States meant what it said. 7 The Plessy
case 8 did not decide that racial segregation was legal when applied to
educational institutions supported by the public, but it did discuss the
matter. There are many expressions of opinion, but few, if any, decisions in which the question of the validity of a state statute requiring
segregation in public schools was the direct issue. A holding that such
a statute was valid would not only seem to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment but it would appear to be out of harmony with the
recent decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court. 9 It is
true that a Massachusetts court held that racial segregation in schools
was constitutional.' 0 Generally, however, classification of citizens upon
a racial basis has been held to violate the Constitution of the United
States."- In Cummings v. Richmond County ' 2 the court stated that
position of arbitrary restraints. The result is that there can be no group segregation without discrimination, and discrimination is neither democratic nor Christian." Charles S. Johnson, PATTERNS OF SEGREGATION 318 (1943).
7 In a recent federal case, Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516 (E. D. S. C.,
1947) the court held that the attempt to deprive a citizen of the right to vote in
a party primary by repealing all statutes regulating primaries and then having
a party pass rules excluding Negroes was an ineffective attempt to evade the
b ourteenth Amendment by the use of a legal technicality.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S.356. 373, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed 220
(1886) the court said: "Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil
eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations
between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of
equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
8 163 U. S.537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896).
9 In Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81.. Sup. Ct.......
, 87 L. Ed.
1774 (1943), Mr. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, states that racial distinctions based upon ancestry "are utterly inconsistent with our traditions and
ideals." 320 U. S. at 110.
In Steele v. Louisiana & Nashville R. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 65 Sup. Ct. 226.
89 L. Ed. 173 (1944), Mr. Justice Murphy, in a concurring opinion, discussed
racial discrimination by a labor union. "The cloak of racism surrounding the action of the Brotherhood in refusing membership to Negroes and in entering into
and enforcing agreement discriminating against them, all under the guise of Congressional authority, still remains. No statutory interpretation can erase this
ugly example of economic cruelty against colored citizens of the United States."
323 U. S. at 209
10 Roberts v. City of Boston, 5 Cush (Mass.) 198 (1849).
11 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ....Sup. Ct ......
25 L. Ed. 664
(1880). The exclusion of Negroes from jury service was held to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
Missouri ex tel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed.
208 (1938). "The equal protection of the law is a pledge of the protection of
equal law." 305 U. S. at 350. The limited demand for equal faciliites and the
temporary character of the discrimination does not excuse it.
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the validity of the requirement of separate schools for white and colored
races was not in issue. Neither was that the direct issue in many of
the recent cases in which there are general statements approving of
segregation upon such a basis. 13 An investigation of three of these
cases shows that when the question had been discussed it was not
essential to the decision. Many 'expressions can be found in which the
courts have assumed that the Plessy doctrine would apply to racial
segregation in public educational institutions. 14 It seems, however,
that the Supreme Court of the United States would not have to overrule the Plessy case to abolish segregation in public schools as established by law; instead it would only have to refuse to extend the doctrine
after a complete consideration of a case squarely upon the merits of
the "separate but equal" theory and a practical application of the doctrine. The attack would not be so much upon the legal doctrine as it
would be upon factual fallacy upon which it is founded. However, if
the Court should feel that there is judicial precedent for such a doctrine it should rid itself of such doctrine at the earliest opportunity.
The Fourteenth Amendment "was designed to assure to the colored
race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the
General Government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied
by the States." 15 If that be the true purpose of the Amendment, not
only must the question be considered from the point of view of judicial
precedent, but the practical application of the theory must be investiPierre v. Louisiana, 306 U. S. 354, 59 Sup. Ct. 536, 83 L. Ed. 757 (1939).
A conviction of murder was invalidated because Negroes were excluded from the
venire from which the grand jurors were drawn.
12 175 U. S. 528, 20 Sup. Ct. 197, 44 L. Ed. 262 (1889).
18 Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U. S. 78, 48 Sup. Ct. 91, 72 L. Ed. 172 (1927)
stated that the "question here is whether a Chinese citizen of the United States
is denied equal protection of the laws when he is classed among the colored race
and furnished facilities for education equal to that offered to all, whether white,
brown, yellow or black."
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 29 Sup. Ct. 33, 53 L. Ed. 81 (1908)
held that a statute punishing a person, corporation or association who operated
an institution for both races was valid as applied to a corporation, but the court
indicated that "the statute is clearly separable and may be valid as to one class,
while invalid to another."
Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 59 Sup. Ct. 232, 83 L. Ed.
208 (1938). The issue was such that any discussion the court may have made on
this issue was superfluous.
14 Typical of the reasoning is that found in Wrighten v. University of South
Carolina, 72 F. Supp. 948 (E. D. S. C., 1947): "Segregation in education may be
considered as a necessity or a luxury, according to the geographical situs. Each
community will have to decide whether it can or desires to sustain the financial
burden of segregation and this must be treated as a political rather than as a
judicial problem." The issue of segregation was not involved. 72 F. Supp. at 950.
15 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 ....... Sup. Ct ....... , 25 L. Ed
664 (1880).
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gated. The courts must also consider whether or not there can be true
equality in schools where segregation based upon ancestry is compelled by law.
In a recent case "I a California district court has repudiated the
doctrine that "separate but equal" public schools would provide equal
protection of the law. This time the segregation was practiced, not
against Negroes, but against children of Mexican descent. The court
pointed out that the theory of racial superiority was erroneous and
refused to allow segregation.
The equal protection of the laws pertaining to the public
school system in California is not provided by furnishing in
separate schools the same technical facilities, textbooks and
courses of instruction to children of Mexican ancestry that are
available to the other public school children regardless of ancestry. A paramount requisite in the American system of public education is social equality. It must be open to all children by unified school association regardless of lineage.1 7
Such a ruling is sound from a legal as well as a sociological and moral
point of view. In the amicus curiae brief, submitted by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People in that case, it was
pointed out that a state statute requiring the racial segregation in
state-supported schools not only violated the Fourteenth Amendment
but it violated the United Nations Charter (Article 55c) which has
been adopted as a part of our law. The government pledged itself
to promote "uniform respect for, and the observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race . . ."
The Act of Chapultepec was signed by the United States with her Latin
American neighbors whereby our government pledged its efforts to prevent racial and religious discrimination. Such international obligations
are binding upon our Federal Government and upon the individual
18
states.
The practical application of the doctrine of "separate but equal"
theory in our public schools is one of the darkest blots upon the history of our nation. Even if we assume that two schools may be equal,
it is a fact that in no manner are the colored schools in the south
"equal" to those schools maintained by the state for white students.
In South Carolina during 1939-40 the average salary per member of
the instructional staff for whites was $953 while only $371 was spent
for colored. In the same state the per capita cost for white pupils was
greater than that per Negro child by 271.8% Such conditions are
typical of those existing in all areas where the "separate but equal"
theory is applied. 19 To allow a minority group to be deprived of the
16
17
Is

Westminster School v. Mendez, 64 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Calif, 1946).
Ibid.
U. S. CONST. ART. VI, § 2.
19 Blose and Culiver, STATISTICS OF THE EDUCATION OF NEGROES: A DECADE
OF PROGRESS, I, 6 (1944).
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fundamental rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution, because of a mere technicality, violates the fundamental principles upon
which our nation was founded. The "separate but equal" theory results in a practical denial of equal rights.
Many courts have issued alternative injunctions on the question of
separate but equal schools for Negroes. In Wrighten v. the Trustees
of the University of Soutk Carolina,20 the court ordered that either no
legal education should be provided by the state, or that the plaintiff
should be admitted to the law school maintained exclusively for white
students, or the state must furnish a "separate but equal" school
for Negroes. Needless to say, the state, pursuant to this decision, is
attempting to establish a separate school. If we assume that the state
officials act in good faith, is it possible for them to establish a professional school equal to one that has been in existence for several decades?
Equality in physical facilities does not make one professional school
equal to another. The quality, training and experience of the faculty,
the curriculum, the extra-curricular activities, the publications, the library, the quality and number of the student body, the standing of
the school in the profession and in the judgment and opinions of the
community as to its values, are all factors which must be weighed in
judging the equality of two schools. To hold that any state could establish, within a short period, a professional school that would be substantially equal to one that has existed for many years is to ignore the
recognized principles upon which professional schools are commonly
rated. Individual differences among the faculty members as well as
among the student body would make it impossible for any court to say
that one school is equal to another for the purposes of excluding a
whole race from one or the other.
Racial segregation creates and promotes a situation in which prejudices and hatreds will grow. It is a fact that the only basis for segregation is the mistaken theory of racial superiority. The psychological
effect upon the segregated students of the "inferior" race in such a
segregated school would make it impossible for the two schools to ever
attain equality. No one doubts that the value of real estate is based
upon the social standing of the occupants in many cases; such a factor
can not be ignored in judging the equality of two schools. To the extent that segregation becomes a psychological burden it becomes a
violation of equal protection of the laws. It can be argued that the
law should not take affirmative action by attempting to remove existing social inequality but it is quite another thing to say that the law
may transform social inequality into a form of legal inequality.
Recently the Supreme Court of the United States has been increasingly concerned with the rights of minorities. 21 Civil rights have
20
21

72 F. Supp. 948 (1947).
But cf.: Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S. 214, 65 Sup. Ct. 193, 89

L. Ed. 194 (1944). Probably this case could be reconciled by the war emergency.
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been protected against oppressive majority discrimination. Freedom
and justice have become inseparable. If our form of government is to
continue, some abuses in our nation must be corrected; otherwise our
pledges to true democracy recently proclaimed by our delegates to the
United Nations, will be considered to be echoes of our own hyprocrisy.
Because the conflicts will be great in a section of our nation which has
deemed it advisable to deny equality and justice to a minority race is
no reason to read into our Constitution a judicial interpretation that
is foreign to the purpose for which it was adopted. As Mr. Justice
Harlan protested in 1896: "There is no caste system here. Our Constitution is color-blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among its
citizens. In respect to civil rights, all citizens are equal before the
law." 22 Neither true equality nor substantial equality will come under
a system based upon racial segregation.
Leonard Boykin, Jr.

THE FUTURE OF THE MODEL CODE OF EvIDENCE.-Referring to the
trial of Socrates, Plato, in his Apology, stated that the accusers of
Socrates said he had the faculty for making the worse cause appear
the better. This same criticism has been leveled at some of the modem day trial attorneys when they achieve the same result by the aid
of outmoded and unrealistic exclusionary rules of evidence. To remedy this obvious injustice, the American Law Institute, with the aid
of experienced judges, lawyers, and educators, formulated a model code
of evidence in 1942. Professor Edmund Morgan of the Harvard Law
School was chosen as Reporter and John Wigmore was selected as Chief
Consultant.' The purpose of the Code is stated by Professor Morgan
in his forward to the Code:
The law of evidence is in such a confused and confusing
condition that it is almost impossible to draft a rule which is
universally accepted without qualification. On the other hand,
many of the rules, if adopted, will make important changes
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 16 Sup. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 1317 (1946).
Assisting as members of the Evidence Editorial group in compiling the
Model Code were Wilbur H. Cherry, University of Minnesota Law School; William G. Hale, University of Southern California Law School; Augustus N. Hand,
United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Mason Ladd, University
of Iowa, College of Law; Learned Hand, United States Circuit Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit; Henry T. Lummus, Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts;
John M. Maguire, Harvard Law School; Charles T. McCormick, University of
Texas Law School; Robert P. Patterson, United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; and Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Boston, Massachusetts. Mr.
Maguire also acted as an Assistant Reporter.
22

1

NOTES
in the common law. They call for serious consideration by
the Bench and Bar; and in considering them the members of
the profession should have constantly in mind the disturbing
truth that more and more of the problems which are traditionally solved by lawyers and judges are being taken from
the courts and handed over to private arbitrators or to official administrative tribunals. To what extent this phenomenon is due to the obstructions to the prompt and efficient investigation and determination of disputes which have been
interposed by antique rules of procedure and the exclusionary
rules of evidence is a question which deserves more than passing attention. Unless Bench and Bar institute a procedure
for quickly disclosing the matters really in dispute between
litigants and for a speedy, inexpensive, and sensible trial and
final determination of those matters, potential litigants will
justifiably resort to other tribunals, official and unofficial.
To say that the courts have not and cannot get personnel
competent to use such a procedure is to confess that our sys2
tem of administration of justice has completely broken down.
It is important to emphasize that the Code is not a restatement of
the law of evidence. The counsel of the American Law Institute, believing as they did that the present law of evidence needed clarification
to make it workable and produce certainty in its application, decided
to eliminate the numerous anachronistic rules. They admitted that a
large part of the law of evidence should be preserved, since it is basically sound, but nevertheless they realized that outmoded rules suppressed rather than developed the truth, and they felt that a thorough
revision of existing law, rather than a restatement, would accomplish
their purposes. It was the view of Professor Morgan that many of the
evils of the present rules are the result of too great particularization
and that more flexibility would not only promote but also expedite justice for the litigants.
With the advent of the trial by jury, rules of evidence were evolved
to regulate the conduct of the trial. The trial by jury supplanted outmoded methods of trial which had proven to be unsatisfactory as instruments of justice. These included trial by battle, ordeal, and compurgation, also known as wager of law. Although classified as trials,
they were actually tests the parties were compelled to undergo to prove
their claims. The wager of law often afforded a dishonest defendant
a means of evading a just obligation and, as a result, it became obsolete
in the royal courts, being supplanted by trial by jury.3
These earlier
2 Mo DE. CODE OF EVID.nmCE, Forward (1942). See also STASON, CASES AND
OTHER MATERzALs ON ADmISTRATIVE TRmUNA.S, 419, Note 12 (1937) where
it is said, "One wonders if the advent of administrative tribunals with their simplified procedure and their relaxation of technical rules of the common law will
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forms of trial became obsolete because the litigants felt that they were
being deprived of substantial justice because of the farcical nature of
the proceedings which became increasingly irrational and which failed
to keep abreast of changing times and conditions, and thus they turned
to the trial by jury. This fact is of prime importance to us today when
we observe the growing use of administrative tribunals in the settlement
of legal controversies. There is a possibility, not too remote, that just
as the trial by jury as we know it today supplanted the earlier methods
of trial, it too, may be supplanted and its functions usurped by administrative tribunals.
The Code, representing, as it does, about three years of concerted,
conscientious effort by the country's leading legal minds, purp.orts to
forestall such a possibility by shearing off the evidentiary barnacles
that hinder rather than aid the true administration of expeditious justice.
The rules of evidence are greatly relaxed and, in some cases, entirely
discarded by statutory provisions creating administrative tribunals
themselves. This is typified by a provision of the National Labor Relations Act which states, "In any such proceeding the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling." 4
in the course of time have a liberalizing effect upon conventional judicial processes. Such a result is not out of the question, and at least a few observers have pronounced it a likelihood."
8 "The most common and popular medieval form of trial by oath was where
the party swore with oath-helpers, and was called compurgation. It consisted in
the producing, by the party adjudged to make the proof, of a specific number of
persons to make oath in his favor; the requisite number varied with the rank of
the parties and of the compurgators, the value of the property in dispute, and the
nature of the suit. These persons were not witnesses, and they swore, not as to
the facts, but as to the truthfulness of the party who produced them in his behalf. In small matters the oath taken was an informal one, but in serious criminal
cases it was made so intricate that its words could only with great difficulty be
repeated, and if the wrong word was used the oath burst and the adversary
won .... From being a favored mode of trial, this 'law,' or, as it was commonly
called 'wager of law' steadily tended to become a thing exceptional; not going
beyond the line of the precedents, and within that line being a mere privilege
alongside the growing . . . trial by jury. In the newer forms of action it was
allowed and finally it survived mainly in Detinue ad Debt. In 1833 it was abolished
in England by Act of Parliament." PLuCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMmoN LAW, 108-111, 325 (2nd Ed., 1936). In the ordeal a hot iron was placed in
the hand of the accused or he was compelled to plunge his hand into boiling water,
then the hand was sealed and kept under seal for three nights. The bandages
were removed, and if the hand was uninjured, he was deemed innocent. In trial
by battle the suitors or their champions engaged in physical contests. There was a
professional band of champions who undertook business all over the country;
courts would arrange the dates of battle so that the champions could fit in their
engagements conveniently. Since very great landowners were so constantly in-

volved in ligitation, they maintained their own fulltime champions. Naturally this
method, which favored the rich, was never popular among the poor.
4 49 Stat. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. § 116 (1935).
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The popular appeal of the administrative tribunal is well illustrated
by the following statement of Robert H. Jackson, Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States:
Most lawyers like court procedure, which is somewhat ceremonial and moves according to a prescribed ritual. Administrative bodies on the other hand, generally sit informally.
Their procedure is not rigid, and many of them admit laymen
to practice. The court receives evidence only according to
technical rules of presentation, competence and relevance.
None but the lawyers understand these rules, and they are
generally in disagreement about their application, which makes
a trial something of a drama of objections and exceptions,
with lawyers playing all speaking roles. The administrative
tribunal is non-technical about the receipt of evidence, its procedure is flexible, and even mistakes are easily amended. A
layman may actually understand what one of these administrative tribunals is doing. Such a tribunal may have a better
knowledge of the problems at issue than the lawyer who presents the case. It may have its own corps of experts to advise and assist it. Such a tribunal is not as dependent as the
ordinary court upon the arguments of partisan counsel to get
at the truth. Skilled advocacy is neither so necessary to keep
such a body informed nor is stupid or cute advocacy so apt
to blur the merits of a controversy. 5
Professor Maguire concurs with Mr. Jackson's opinion that there is a
real danger that administrative tribunals may usurp the functions of
the courts unless constructive changes are instituted. He believes the
easier administrative practice is pleasing to the litigant. 6
In our discussion thus far of the Model Code of Evidence, we have
attempted to present the obvious need for an improvement of the
Illinois Commerce Commission Law, Acts, Sec. 702. par. 702 (1921). California
Administrative Procedure Act, Sec. 11, 512, ch. 867 (1945). The hearing need not
be conducted according to technical rules relating to evidence and witnesses. Any
relevant evidence shall be admitted if it is the sort of evidence on which responsible
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs regardless of the
existence of any common law or statutory rule which might make improper the
admission of such evidence over objection in civil actions.
See also, Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrato,', 312 U. S. 126, 61 S. Ct. 524, 85
L. Ed. 624 (1941), where Mr. justice Stone says "It has long been settled that the
technical rules for the exclusion of evidence applicable in jury trials do not apply
to proceedings before federal administrative agencies in the absence of a statutory
requirement that such rules are to be observed." New York Workmen's Compensation Act, Sec. 68, ch. 41, Acts of 1914.
5 JAcKsom, The Administrative Process, 5 JouRNAL oF Soc.AL P mosoPHEY,
143, 146-149 (1940).
6 GOODRIcH, GARDNER, MCCORMCK, PARKER, and MoRGAN, Spotlight on
Evidence, 27 J. Am. JuD. Soc., 113-117 (1943).
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present day system of trial by jury, and we have pointed out that it
was the intention of the compilers of the Code, in part at least, to satisfy
this need. The prime question then is: Does the Code improve the
everyday jury trial? If not yet, then will it in the future improve
practical methods of obtaining justice for the litigants? Unless the
Code does actually aid the judge, jury, counsel and litigants to arrive
at truth, its contribution to legal knowledge is purely academic. It
would be well, then, to consider the recognition the Code has received
among its prospective users, the bench and bar.
It is rather obvious that the greatest part of the Model Code conforms to the universally necessary and accepted regulations now in
effect as rules of evidence. These standards are not questioned in any
jurisdiction and are admittedly productive of justice in jury trials. It
is the practices prevalent in many jurisdictions which the makers of
the Code feel do not expedite justice, that form the vortex of discussion.
Because the Model Code does not conform, in certain instances to
the existing Ailes of evidence, it has been branded as too radical. It
is questionable that this is a legitimate objection. If worthless rules
exist, to reject their change is illogical. It would seem that a more advantageous evaluation of the Model Code would be found in an examination of the existing situation under the old rule and then the performance of a theoretical investigation under the Code regulation. From
a comparison of the two results, the practice most likely to bring justice to the parties should be chosen. This, of course, would entail a
thorough familiarization by each jurisdiction with the tenets of the
Model Code. This has been undertaken in many jurisdictions.7
To date, the Model Code has not been extensively cited as authority by courts. Indeed, it would be amazing, if it had been since the
Code has been in existence for only five years.
Courts' mention of the Code has generally been restricted to little
more than comment. In the cases in which it has been cited as author7 MAGuiRE,

EviDFccE, 164-165

(1947,

says "Men who sound like good

prophets warn us that if the judiciary continues to carry only outmoded stock of
procedural goods, it may find itself without customers. Once change over the
fashion from judicial litigation to administrative litigation, and it will be cold comfort for the legal profession to speculate upon the likelihood that the inherent
vices of administrative procedure may grow with the debilitating ease of firm
establishment and the fading of early crusading fervor. Destruction of business
or professional good-will, the habit of coming back to the old stand for more, is
a matter of long-term regret. If before popular revulsion comes, the courts as we
now know them have lost their hold, resuscitation of their fine qualities and influence will be a slow, hard job. Wisdom demands timely renovation of features
like the hearsay rule which impair the competitive position of judges as against
administrators, arbitrators, and their kin. Any extensive triumph at this time of
calculated obstructionism, mentioned in our second chapter as the essence of the
law of evidence, will indeed be a Pyrrhic Victory."
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ity, the holding was in accord with the pre-existing general rule of the
jurisdiction. And usually, in addition, cases were cited to substantiate
the general rule. The Code under these conditions, is no more than
declaratory of the accepted general rule."
The Model Code represents a practical guidepost for the future, but
whether it will be utilized depends upon a number of factors. Times
change, popular thinking changes, and unless the laws and rules adapt
themselves to meet present day conditions, they will be relegated to
the oblivion that they justly deserve. Many feel the Code is too radical. If their contention is correct then it will be read, discussed, and
filed away in the library as a fine theoretical dissertation to be cited
and referred to by students and educators. The law is a changing
force and it is always in a continual process of growth. A study of
the growth of the law reveals that any new change or development contrary to solidified precedents has been labeled "radical." If, however,
the Code is to have a practical application, it is necessary that it be
used in the determination of litigation by the courts and be adopted
by the legislatures of the various states.
Codes are not new. From the most ancient Codes of Hammurabi,
King of Babylon, promulgated about 2100 B. C., through the Justinian
Code, the New York Field Act Code, to the present Federal Administrative Act of 1946, codification has attempted to introduce certainty
and rationality into the law. The Model Code of Evidence, possessing,
as it does, certainty and rationality, represents, it would seem, the best
available touchstone by which the courts can extricate themselves from
ilavish obedience to rigid formalism which has no place in our fastmoving, high-tempo, modern society. It is a complete coverage of the
entire subject of evidence formulated on the theory that. since ascertainment of truth is the prime requisite of the court, all relevant evidence should be admitted and exclusionary rules curtailed.
Although the Code fulfills a long felt need in the law of evidence,
nevertheless, at the present time, we see only faint glinnerings of its
8 Very great weight was accorded a Model Code of Evidence rule in The
C.G.R.-180, 70 F. Supp. 975 (1946).
Other cases which do little more than acknowledge that the Model Code of
Evidence presents a rule similar to that always in existence in their jurisdictions
are: Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Rochinski, 158 F. (2d) 325 (1946); Wright v. Wilson. 154 F. (2) 616 (1946); United States v. Angelo, 153 F. (2d) 247 (1945);
People v. One Mercury Sedan, 74 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 168 P. (2d) 443 (1946);
Knox v. Knox, 22 Minn. 477, 25 N. W. (2d) 225 (1946); In re Forsythe's Estate,

221 Minn. 318, 22 N. W. (2d) 19 (1946); Stella Cheese Co. v. Chicago St. P., M.
& 0. Ry. Co., 248 Wis. 202, 21 N. W. (2d) 655 (1946); Meeks Motor Freight v.
Ham's Adm'r., 302 Ky. 71, 193 S. W. (2d) 745 (1945); State v. Scott et at.,
Utah ...... , 175 P. (2d) 1016 (1947); Vanadium Corporation of America v.
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland et a[., 159 F. (2d) 105 (1947); Brasher v.
State, .... Ala...
30 So. (2d) 26 (1946), 30 So. (2d) 31 (1947); and Bloch v.
Brown. .....
..
29 So. (2d) 665 (1947).
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recognition by the courts. But it is our opinion that when the true
worth of this monumental effort is realized generally by the members
of the bench and bar, it will be accepted and integrated into the American system of jurisprudence and exert a tremeudous influence on the
courts of the future. 9
John J. Broderick, Jr.*
Thomas F. Broden

BLACI.FoRD's REpo1RTs.-The broad highway of adequate present
day legal reporting often narrows to a backwoods trail or a frontier
path for those who make the journey to our legal yester-years. Such
would be the case for the State of Indiana were it not for the life and
work of one of her adopted sons, Isaac Blackford.
He was born in Bound Brook, New Jersey, November 6, 1786, the
same year of Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts. During his pre-school
years, a constitution for the United States was written and a government was set in operation. Before his high school years, a westward
movement was active; Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee had been
admitted to the Union; St. Clair had been defeated by the Indians;
and Wayne had regained control of a portion of the Northwest Territory from the Indians. President Washington's terms had given place
to the term of John Adams. During Blackford's high school years,
President Washington had died at Mount Vernon, the federal capital
had been moved to Washington, D. C., and Jefferson had been inaugurated president.
Blackford's early love for books and learning was evident, and his
scholastic ability was soon proved after he enrolled in Princeton in
1802 at the age of sixteen years. He was at the same time one of the
youngest and strongest of a class containing many men who were later
to be governors and judges of their respective states.' His studies led
him in his junior year into Civil Law, and in his senior year into
*Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
9 In the 1947 revised edition of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure there
appears a note to Rule 43, Evidence, on p. 44, which infers very strongly that the
Model Code of Evidence will definitely influence future rules. "While consideration
of a comprehensive and detailed set of rules of evidence seems very desirable, it
has not been feasible for the committee so far to undertake this important task.
Such consideration should include the adaptability to federal practice of all or
paits of the proposed Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute.' (Italics
ours.)

See also Armstrong, Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 F. R. D. 124, 137-8 (1945).
1 Alexander, Life and Characteil of Judge Blackford, 6 So. L. Rxv. (N. S.)
907 (1881).
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Blackstone's Commentaries. The next short step in his legal training
was into the law office of Colonel George McDonald of Middlebrook, a
hamlet adjoining Bound Brook, shortly after his graduation from
Princeton in 1806. During his college years the current events included the statehood of Ohio, the Louisiana Purchase, the Burr-Hamilton duel, and the Lewis and Clark Expedition. After a year's study
with Colonel McDonald, he moved to the law office of Judge Gabriel
Ford of Morristown. He was admitted to the New Jersey bar in 1810,
having completed three years of study in the office of Judge Ford. He
then faced the inevitable question for all lawyers: where to practice.
It is difficult to determine why he heard the call of the west. He was
a shy, quiet, soft-spoken scholar with a natural inclination toward study
and contemplation. What charm did the rigors of a frontier western
life offer such a citizen? Why would he leave the office of a successful
and outstanding citizen of New Jersey, Judge Ford?
Benjamin Parke, an excellent lawyer, had moved from New Jersey
to Indiana in 1801. Jonathan Jennings, later to be Indiana's first governor, was born a few miles from Bound Brook. It is not known
whether they corresponded directly or indirectly with young Blackford,
but they both did much to help him later in Indiana. In any event, in
1811, the young Princeton graduate and member of the New Jersey
bar walked to a tributary of the Ohio River and flatboated down to
Lawrenceburg, Indiana, to see Isaac Dunn, a friend of Judge Ford. He
traveled on to Cincinnati and Dayton, Ohio, but came back to Indiana
2
to make Brookville his first residence in this state.
He was aware of his severest handicap, a lack of speaking ability.
He knew also and would regret later his ineptness at trial practice.
Other frontier activities claimed his attention and at various times
in the next five years he served as a bank cashier, a newspaper editor,
Salem County clerk, clerk of the territorial legislature, and territorial
judge.3
Knox County elected him in 1816 as its representative to the first
legislature of the state and that body elected him its speaker. His kind
friendliness and eminent fairness, as well as his demonstrated ability,
impressed all those who observed his work in the legislature. He was
marked to rise in law or government.
The judicial system soon organized provided for a three-member
supreme court. Those appointments reflected the powerful political
forces of that day headed by Jennings, Noble, and Hendricks. Legend
has it that they were not personal friends, but they did agree to harmonize their political actions. Jennings became governor; Noble, a
2

Esarey and Shockley, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF INDIANA Vol. I, 188 (1916).
AND HisToRicAL. SxETcHs oF EARLY INDIANA 344

3 Woolen, BomAPnicA
(1883).
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United States senator; and Hendricks, a congressman. These three
men chose the members of the "Old Supreme Court." Jennings chose
his friend and neighbor, James Scott. Noble chose his friend and
neighbor, Jesse L. Holman. Hendricks, through political consideration,
chose John Johnson of Vincennes.
Johnson died after one term of the court and at the funeral Governor Jennings informed Blackford that he was considering appointing
him to the supreme court vacancy. Such offer was consistent with the
help Jennings had heretofore given his fellow New Jersey emigrant.
They had also found friendship and common ground in their openly
antagonistic attitude toward Territorial Governor Harrison's consent to
4
evasions of the anti-slavery restrictions of the Ordinance of 1787.
Able and powerful supporters of Harrison were attempting to introduce
slavery into this state, and Harrison was turning a sympathetic political
ear. Blackford read Article VI of the Ordinance of 1787, "There shall
be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted." To Blackford this was plain and capable of
only one interpretation, and from this conflict grew a continuing personal animosity toward Harrison.
At the offer of the supreme court appointment, Blackford is said
to have pleaded his youth and inexperience. He knew that such lawyers as Parke, Dewey, Noble, and Lane would be practicing before
the court. Jennings, however, had confidence in Blackford's ability
and made the appointment in 1817. Indiana was to have cause for
appreciating the choice.
Thus the stage was set for the important part of Blackford's life
work in growing with Indiana's judicial system and helping it to mature. It is somewhat difficult now to appreciate the problems of a
newly organized supreme court in a pioneer society. Indiana in 1816
was the nineteenth state in a federal government which had been organized only twenty-seven years before. The common law and constitutional provisions as interpreted by the new supreme court would be
the anchor of government until modifications by legislative enactments
could come with time and social needs. Into this picture Blackford
fitted perfectly. When, thirty-six years later, Indiana wrote a new
constitution and the constitutional convention composed of many lawyers laughed at the common law form of action of ejectment and similar seeming legal monstrosities, it might be well to consider whether
Blackford or the reformers were to be desired in 1816. Blackford came
to his new task with a fine education and an excellent knowledge of
the common law. He seemed also to find pleasure in the isolation and
lonesomeness of legal research. Once he had investigated a subject, his
fellow judges felt that that section of the field was exhausted.
4
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He took his place upon the supreme bench at thirty-one years of
age. James Iredell, a Princeton classmate, had been similarly honored
in North Carolina at that early age. Judge Story had been appointed
to the Supreme Court of the United States at the age of thirty-two.
Some older lawyers were to wonder at such youthful appointees but in
each case the choice proved sound.
In 1819 he returned to visit the McDonald family in Middlebrook,
New Jersey, and to fall in love with their sixteen-year-old daughter.
The McDonald family moved to Vincennes that fall, and the next
year the thirty-four-year-old supreme court judge married the vivacious
seventeen-year-old daughter of the McDonalds. There were some
noticeable discords as the two personalities attempted to harmonize,
but tragedy interrupted when the wife died with the birth of a son,
George, in 1821. Blackford resolved not tomarry again and his life of
a hermit and recluse began. He was driven farther down his lonesome
road when his son died before maturity. The supreme court headquarters had been a room in the governor's mansion on the circle in
Indianapolis, and this came to be Blackford's home, library, and world.
Fate conspired to narrow his vision. The admonition to an English
Chancellor, "Go out and talk with the people" could have been profitably heard by Blackford.
As early as 1822 he became conscious of a growing need to have
the Indiana Supreme Court decisions reported. No provisions had been
made for such reports when the government was organized. His plan
called for a study of punctuation and writing style as well as the study
of all the latest law reports. The publications would be at his own expense for whatever profit they could earn. He would select, rewrite,
and discard decisions so that his reports would best represent principles
of common law in varied jurisdictions. Perhaps they might be cited
and used beyond the borders of Indiana. As the work developed, a
powerful desire also developed in Blackford to have everything absolutely correct, and he spared neither his time, labor, nor money. 5 He
carried on correspondence with Webster concerning doubtful words.
Progress seemed slow, but his first volume was ready for publication in
1830. He had one thousand copies made "of that edition. It took its
place beside the Massachusetts and New York reports and found its
way into English legal libraries.
Chancellor Kent commended it for its extensive and accurate law
learning and its valuable annotations. Washington Irving, then secretary to the American Legation at the Court of St. James, wrote, "I
meet with it frequently, and I am often asked as to the antecedents of
its author, whose name is already quite familiar at Westminster."
Volume II was published in 1834, and, since several copies of Volume I were on hand, Blackford ordered only seven hundred fifty copies
5 Reed, ENcYCLoPr.A or BioGR.wn or INDIANA Vol. I, 11 (1895).
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of that printing. One thousand copies of Volume III were published in
1836, the same number of Volume IV in 1840, the same again for Volume V in 1844.
Since sales were increasing by this time, fifteen hundred copies of
Volume VI were published in 1845, and the same number of Volume
VII in 1847. Twelve hundred fifty copies of Volume VIII were published in 1850. Volume IX was in preparation when, to Blackford's
surprise, Thomas L. Smith, a fellow supreme court judge, published a
volume covering the same decisions. Blackford decided to cease publishing reports. Thus came to a close thirty years of hard, faithful
work and excellent accomplishments. The name Blackford was an Indiana household word. He was considered more of a lawmaker than
the state legislature. Chancellor Kent again commented, "It is an interesting fact to find not only the lex mercatoria of the English common
law, but the refinements of the English equity system, adopted and enforced in the State of Indiana as early as 1820, when we consider how
recently that country had then risen from a wilderness into a cultivated and civilized community."
Several facts attest to Blackford's long continuing popularity. Several times he was a strong anti-machine political candidate even though
he was no orator, no glad-hander, nor in any sense a political planner.
In 1835 a law professorship was created at Indiana University and
Judge Blackford was elected to the chair, but he declined the offer. In
1838 the state legislature approved the organization of a new county
and Blackford's name was given to it. His popular appeal vanished
with the advent of Jacksonian Democracy with the spreading of the
demand for legal reform, and with the calling of a second Indiana Constitutional Convention in 1850. The story might well end when Judge
Isaac Blackford, the senior judge of the Supreme Court of Indiana, administered the oath to the convention delegates on Monday, October 7.
The convention debates, however, reveal the reason for and the
nature of the change which came in the judiciary. Some delegates
were of the opinion that the supreme court reorganization was one of
the chief reasons for calling a convention. Others noticed that some
cases had been before the court from five to seven years awaiting a
decision. 6 Another complained that he had a suit for ten thousand
dollars before the court for two years and no decision was forthcoming
yet. Still others defended the court because of the increased litigation
in an increasing population, and suggested a five-member supreme court
be organized. The convention resolved the question by providing for a
five-member supreme court to be elected instead of appointed. The
convention also wrote a protest into Article 7, Section 6: "The General
Assembly shall provide by law, for the speedy publication of decisions
6 DEBATES IN THE INDIANA CONVENTION oF 1850, Indiana Historical Collection

Reprint 1654 (1935).

NOTES
of the Supreme Court, made under this Constitution; but no judge
shall be allowed to report such decisions." (Italics supplied).
Blackford was unable to win an election for a place on the "New
Supreme Court" in 1852. He was later defeated in convention for a
position of supreme court reporter. Thomas A. Hendricks defeated him
in a Democratic congressional convention. It was difficult for Blackford to find himself with little to do, even though his fortune in Indianapolis real estate had grown into a quarter of a million dollars in
value.7 He made an unsuccessful attempt to practice law before being
appointed to the Court of Claims at Washington by President Pierce.
He served there until he died December 31, 1859.
Lawyers today, even as his contemporaries, appreciate his contribution. 0. H. Smith, himself a leader in Indiana law in Blackford's day,
said, "Judge Johnson lived but a short time and Isaac Blackford, of
Vincennes, a young lawyer from New Jersey, a graduate of Princeton,
was appointed to the vacancy. Like Judge Story, he looked too young
for that high judicial station, but, to say the least, he came fully up to
the expectations of his friends, as his decisions and reports conclusively
show. He is now one of the judges of the United States Court of
Claims, sitting in Washington. The principal characteristic of the
mind of Judge Blackford is caution. He never guesses. Declamation
with him is nothing, precedent and good authority everything." 8
The Southern Law Review in 1881 stated that Blackford "was preeminently a common-law lawyer and contributed more than any other
man of his time to the high character of Indiana's judicial reputation." 9
The Green Bag in 1890 called the reports "Blackford's monument;
and no better example of reporting can be produced in America or England." 10
On Blackford's monument in Crown Hill Cemetery in Indianapolis
is a list of his achievements with the closing line, "The honors thus
conferred were the just reward of an industry that never wearied, of an
integrity that was never questioned."
Robert F. Burns

7 Thornton, Isaac Blackford, the Indiana Blackstone, INDLwAAHISTORY
T3N Vol. VIII, 327 (1931).
8

Smith,

9

6 So. L. Rv. (N. S.) 907 (1881).

10

EARLY INDIAA TkLRAND SKETCHES 85 (1858).

THE GREEN BAG Vol. IV (1892).
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LABOR LAw-ComMENT ON THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT, TITLE I.-

Of all the statites enacted by the Eightieth Congress, in its first session,
the Labor Management Relations Act, 19471 seems destined to have
the most far-reaching effect. The Taft-Hartley Act, as it is more popularly designated, is a hurried attempt to deal with the most complex
and crucial domestic problem of our society, the relationship of labor,
capital and government. Prior to this legislation, the common law of'
labor relations had evolved from juridical concepts manifest both in
legislation 2 and in rulings3 whereby mutual aid among workers was
considered an indictable conspiracy. The long sought-for day had at
last been reached when collective bargaining was recognized as a right
to be protected by government. This recognition was crystalized in
the 1935 Wagner Act. 4 The impact of the Taft-Hartley Act is of such
moment as to be a matter of consequence to every citizen, since it is
based on an old hypothesis, which, nevertheless, had not been seen in
this century's legislation-a hypothesis as to the very purpose of labor
law. Upon the validity of this theory, which itself will appear in the
study of the statute, rests the validity of the enactment.
Following veto by the President of the joint Senate-House conference bill, the House of Representatives overrode the veto by a vote
of 331-83. Three days later, on June 23, 1947, the Senate followed
suit by a vote of 68-25. Provisions of the Act went into effect at various times-some at the date of passage and some awaiting operation
until one year thereafter. 5 In the first three months following passage of the Act there were only two adjudications 6 relevant to its provisions. Although it is too soon to determine the implications and validity of the various provisions under the x-ray of judicial interpretation
and analysis, the tests will not be long pending. Both major associations of labor organizations, the Congress of Industrial Organizations
1 Public Law 101, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Ch. 120, hereinafter called the TaftHartley Act: H.R. 3020-Text of bill as reported by House Committee on Education and Labor; H.R. 3020-Report of Committed on Education and Labor
(Report No. 245, Minority Report No. 510); S. 1126-Text of bill as reported
by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare; Report on S. 1126 by
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare-Report No. 105, Minority Report No.
105--Part 2; H.R. 3020-as passed by the Senate, May 13, 1947; H.R. 3020-

final text as agreed on in conference, reported June 3, 1947, for Congressional
adoption and submission to the President; H.R. 3020-official explanation of the
final bill by Conference Committee Managers on the part of the House, June 3,
1947; H.R. 3020-Presidential Veto Message, June 20, 1947; 96 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 67, 85.
2

2 & 3 Edw. 6, c. 15.

8 Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach 274, Eng. Reprints 240 (1783).
4 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Sta. 449, 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 151 et seq.
(1935).
5 Secs. 102, 103, 104. Unless otherwise indicated all references to sections,
hereinafter, refer to P. L. 101.
6 Eastern Gas and Fuel Associates v. N. L. R. B.. .... F. (2d) .... (C. C. A.-7,
1947) ; Oil Workers et al. v. Elliott, .... F. Supp .... (D. C. N. D. Tex., 1947).
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and the American Federation of Labor, are preparing test cases on the
different provisions. Of the Taft-Hartley Act's five Titles or main divisions, only Title I may be studied, prior to judical action, relative to
previous law, with any hope of reasonably accurate comment. 7 A
glance at the others will suffice. Title n is entitled "Conciliation of
Labor Disputes In Industries Affecting Interstate Commerce; National
Emergencies." Suits by and against labor unions are provided for in
Title III. By Title IV, the joint study board on the problem of labor
relations, recommended by President Truman is established. The final
portion, Title V, merely provides definitions, saving provisions and separability. Immediately after passage of the Act there began a flow of
arguments for and against it. Many constructive criticisms and analytical studies have emerged from the arguments, 8 as to these four Titles.
Title I is the portion most susceptible of concrete analysis prior to
judical determination of its provisions because it consists of a series of
amendments of, and additions to, the often-tested National Labor Relations Act. Generally, it may be said, most of the employer activities
prohibited by the 1935 statute are, by the 1947 statute, made prohibited
employee activities. In addition, certain specific functions of labor
unions are drastically curtailed. A more detailed study of the provisions of this portion of the enactment would be incomprehensible without noting at least briefly, the economic and political factors which
were, collectively, its proximate cause.
Many political scientists conclude that the character of the Congress
passing this Act was primarily the reaction of the electorate to years of
wartime controls necessarily imposed by the preceding legislative majority and its party's administrations. True, a solution to the problem
of labor-management relations was a matter of public concern but
there was clearly no mandate for any action like the statute in question. This view is substantiated by the campaign history wherein both
parties promised a study of the problem but neither committed itself
to any appreciable number of the restrictions finally enacted. Rightly
or wrongly the voters were more interested in freedom from restrictions
than in adequate legislative solutions. However, this Act is the culmination rather than the initiation of American legislation restricting labor practices. Beginning in 1943 with the passage in twelve states of
what we may call "restrictive" statutes, the trend has become even
more pronounced. At this writing some thirty states have such restrictive laws on their books. Some of these outlaw union security
agreements, and others impose mandatory arbitration. Certain of the
legislatures have even attempted to outlaw the basic right to strike. In
North Carolina, Arizona, Nebraska, Tennessee and Florida, the Ameri7 The NomT,
DAvm
LAwYER contemplates commenting on other Titles
of the Act in subsequent issues.
8 See bibliography in 22 Journal of the State Bar of California 407.
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can Federation of Labor is testing the constitutionality of various
phases of the anti-closed shop acts. 9 Probably these test cases will be
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. Thus it is apparent that the federal government is not alone in its attempt to find the
answer to the overall problem.
All this legislation cannot reasonably be ascribed to the work of any
clique or combination of interests. It is rather an attempt to solve
such an apparent dilemma such as that dramatically met in the Lewis
contempt case,' 0 wherein the right to strike appeared to conflict with
the public welfare. Some solution was mandatory. The President
suggested a thorough Congressional study of the problem in order that
adequate legislative action might follow. Nevertheless the most ardent
proponents of the Taft-Hartley Act deny that its purpose is to solve
the basic problem. These men explain that the hope is merely to
equalize bargaining positions. But the enactment of this statute had
other roots also, such as the abuse, by a few unions, of racial equality
rights," the jurisdictional strike, alleged mishandling of union funds
and demands for pay of unneeded help. Another reason for the act-and
an obvious and important one-was the toleration of Communists and
persons of the lunatic political fringe in some positions of union authority. There are compelling domestic and international reasons why
such a situation must be corrected (witness the strife in France and
Italy during the fall and winter of 1947). That the unions themselves had begun to correct some of these abuses was insufficient to
overcome the realization that positive governmental action was required,
even though the abuses were the exception and not the rule. The most
obvious cause underlying the enactment, (but only partially responsible
for it), was the pressure of such groups as the National Association
of Manufacturers, who, for more than ten years had fought the Wagner Act and all that it guaranteed. Such organizations, with their vast
financial resources, engaged in extensive political activity to insure
passage of this Act.
These, then, were the major factors contributing to the atmosphere
in which the Taft-Hartley Bill became the Taft-Hartley Act. Opposition to passage was almost exclusively that of Democrats from western,
northern and eastern states.
In any study of Title I it is essential that the policy and aims of
the Wagner Act, which it revises, be kept in mind. The extent to which
the problems at which the 1935 statute was directed are solved, and
9 Address of Joseph A. Padway, General Counsel of the A. F. L. to the 1947
convention.
10

United States v. Lewis, 330 U. S. 258, 67 Sup. Ct. 677, 91 L. Ed. 595,

(1947), noted in 22 NoTRE DAmx- LAWYER 432 (1947).
11 The by-laws of the C. I. 0. provide against any racial discrimination by
members.
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the problems which have arisen in the interim, gives us the means for
evaluating the Act.
The Act states its purpose to be:
To amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide
additional facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, and for other purposes.
In view of the changes made in the Wagner Act it was necessary to
broaden the declaration of policy to include an expression of intent to
control more strictly the activities of labor organizations as they affect
interstate commerce.1 2 This is another long step in extending the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution. It is likewise a recognition that
not all strikes are the result of the employer's inequitable conduct.
Any detailed study of Title I must assume a working knowledge of
the Wagner Act. Title I will be noted primarily insofar as it has
altered, or added to, the earlier statute.
Among the "findings" 13 of Congress set forth as the basis of Title
I, the only addition listed to the findings of the Wagner Act is the one
upon which the main premises of the Act must stand or fall: namely
that unions, their officers and members, engage in activities intentionally
or necessarily impeding the flow of commerce, and that such activities
are therefore subject to elimination. The challenge to these premises
and their conclusion will, quite obviously, be to the effect that the
Commerce Clause is limited by those constitutional provisions guaranteeing the rights of citizens. 14
Certain "definitions" 15 as used in the Wagner Act are altered. Labor organizations are now "persons" 1s for purposes of the statute. Due
to subsequent provisions 17 affecting union practices this broadening of
definitions was required. The meaning of "employer" is contracted 18
to exclude the government and its corporations, thus relieving them
from the prohibition against unfair practices. Likewise the synonyms
for "employees" are reduced 19 to the exclusion of independent contractors, supervisors and workers subject to the Railway Labor Act.
The exclusion of supervisory employees is clarified by subsequent definition.20 The Ellender amendment to the Case bill, in 1946, sought to
Sec. I(b).
Sec. 1.
U. S. CoNsT. ART. XIII, Sec. 1, "Neithdr slavery nor involuntary servitude
. shall exist within the United States ...
15 Sec. 2.
16 Sec. 2 (1).
17 Secs. 8 and 10.
12

13
14

18

Sec. 2 (2).

19 Sec. 2 (3).
20

Sec. 2 (11).
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broaden the meaning of the term, and the result is finally obtained
here. By this definition, (which includes even foremen) when coupled
with a later section of the Title 21 supervisors cannot be included in
any bargaining unit, mixed or separate. (Prior to this enactment supervisors were, of course, held to be employees. 22 ) This latter section is
one of the few which have as yet received judicial application. A decision of a lower court ruling, under the 1935 National Labor Relations
Act, recognizing supervisors as within the Wagner Act, was reversed in
Young Spring and Wire Corporation v. N. L. R. B., 23 since the decision's operation would necessarily be in Juturo and contrary to the
statute. The National Labor Relations Board has ruled similarly on
this section. 24 Under Title I, and the entire statute, a supervisor is
now stripped of all statutory rights as an employee and of all the legal
protection of his natural, moral right to organize. These sections
show too tender a regard for the common good and a failure to properly
regard the supervisor's individual right. Another exception from operation of this law is found in a re-enactment of the Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act 25 section excluding agricultural laborers.
Yet another added definition is that 26 of "professional employees"
who, when the definition is read with regard to a later provision, 27 are
required to be in bargaining units separate from those of non-professional workers, unless a majority of such professional workers votes
for inclusion in the unit. Neither reason nor the Congressional Record supply any grounds for such a distinction. Also excepted from
operation of the Act are employees of Federal Reserve banks and
charitable hospitals. The last of the definitions is a clear abrogation
of the common law and as such must, fortunately, be strictly construed.
Its importance merits a full reading:
(13) In determining whether any person is acting as an
"agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling. (Italics supplied.)
Under a literal interpretation of this sub-section a union might be made
liable for wildcat strikes or other actions beyond its real power to
control. Only a well disciplined union could avoid such a liability and
Sec. 14 (a).
Packard Motor Car Co. v. N. L. R. B., 330 U. S. 485, 67 Sup. Ct. 789, 91
L. Ed. 697 (1947), noted in 22 NoT
DAmra LAwYER 441 (1947).
23
(C. C. A.-D. C., 1947), 13 Labor Cases C. C. H. 64,029.
24 Eastern Gas and Fuel Association v. N. L. R. B.. .... F 2 (d) ...., (C. C. A.
-6, 1947), 13 Labor Cases C. C. H.
25 18 L. R. R. M 30, 21.
26 Sec. 2 (12).
27 Sec. 9.
21

22
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yet, as one authority has observed, 28 in subsequent provisions the Act
drastically curtails the union's right to discipline its members by threat
of discharge, in union shops, "for engaging in wildcat strikes or dual
unionism or other disruptive activity." It will now be necessary for
unions to contract a barrier to such liability. This provision is a plain
indication that the Act is a compromise between those who would control and those who would destroy organized labor. In the light of
subsequent sections 29 which would make coercion or restraint regarding the exercise of certain "rights," 30 by "a labor organization or its
agents," an unfair labor practice and which gives a cause of action
to anyone injured by boycotts and certain strikes 31-thus abrogating a
large part of the Norris-La Guardia Act 32-the purpose appears to
place labor in a position of absolute liability. An employer's liability
for the acts of his agents is in no way comparable in view of his infinitely greater control of his vicarious actors. Was such a fantastic result as is patent in this definition really the intent of Congress, taking
into consideration its expressed goal of industrial peace? Probably not.
Senator Taft himself has asserted, "I can see no legitimate objection
to a limitation of liability by unions for acts of others which it cannot
restrain." 88
The next section 3 4 of Title I provides for a revision of the functions
and structure of the National Labor Relations Board and for a General
Counsel of unprecedented peacetime administrative power. Composition of the Board is increased from three to five members8 5 with a
wage boost 86 from $10,000 to $12,000 annually per member. Outstanding among the Board's new tasks, by way of controlling the conduct of labor organizations, are those of holding elections for unionshop determination,8 7 'settling unfair labor practices as to jurisdictional
disputes 88 and seeking injunctions from the judiciary.8 9 By detailed
codification of its functions and scope the Congress is attempting to
limit the possibility of decisions which were truly unjust but most of
which were, as General Counsel Denham has admitted, ". . .one by
one... corrected as the cases came before the Courts .. ." The implications of these sections are so numerous as to prohibit study in this
28

Bull. No. 4, of International Brotherhood of Teamsters, explaining the

Taft-Hartley Act.
29 Sec. 8 (b) (1).
80 Sec. 7.
s1 Sec. 303 (b).
82

33
34

Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. A. Sec. 101 et seq. (1932).
Explanation of thd Taft-Harfley Act, by Senator Taft.
Secs. 3-6.

85

Sec. 3 (a).

86
87
88

Sec. 4 (a).
Sec. 9 Ce).
Sec. 10 (k).

89 Sec. 10 (1).
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treatment. Suffice it to note that the over-all effect is to give the Board,
which is a quasi-judicial body, even wider jurisdiction and more limited
investigating duties. Although it is established as law 40 that the principle of due process received full support under the operations of the
Wagner Act Board, the new statute separates the investigation from
the hearing. To this end, among others, the office of General Counsel
was created.
Creation of the General Counsel and assignment of his duties constitutes the greatest extension of bureaucracy, by a single legislative mandate, ever attempted without the use of war powers. "He shall have
final authority ... in respect to the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints . . ." under the section providing for the prevention of "unfair labor practices," 41 ,,... and in respect of the prosecu-

tion of such complaints before the Board." 42 Read in conjunction with
the prescribed application of these duties it is at once plain that there
is an unprecedented degree of power, in this appointee, rgarding the
course of labor relations. Of the officer's authority the General Counsel
himself realized that, "Viewed from one standpoint, his powers are
broad and absolute and his authority final to an outstanding degree
seldom accorded a single officer in a peacetime agency." 48 It is difficut to ascribe the centralizing of such authority, on so vital a matter,
to a high purpose. "He is the final authority as to whether such
charges shall be dismissed, or whether complaints shall be issued and
the cases prosecuted." 44 It can only be hoped that this partially independent administrator is well versed in the social and economic ends
sought, by enlightened public policy, to be attained.
These sections, reforming the Board's function, have restricted it,
procedurally, far more than other agencies within the Administrative
Procedure Act. 45

The whole plan of the Title would seem to be the

effecting of a horizontal increase and a vertical decrease in the Board's
jurisdiction.
The section 41 following is a description of certain rights of employees. The only "right" added to those acknowledged by the Wagner
Act is the "right" to refrain from any activity tending to the advantages of collective bargaining, except, of course, in a union shop. 47 For
40 N. L. R. B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U. S. 1, 57 S.
Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893 (1937).

41
42

Sec. 10.
Sec. 3 (d).

'43 Address to American Bar Association, Cleveland, Ohio.
44 Remarks of Geperal Counsel Denham before St. Louis Bar Association,
Nov. 3, 1947.
45 P. L. No. 404, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 11, 1946); Note 96 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 67 (1947)

46
47

Sec. 7.
Sec. a (a) (3).
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the first time since the judicial repudiation of the yellow-dog contract,
the scab is given a legal grounds for his conduct.
Perhaps the most important portion of Title I is that prohibiting
and re-defining "unfair labor practices." 48 Here again appears the
attempt to mix the balm-like oils of social justice with the cold, black
ink of the pen of Adam Smith. Those acts of the employer which the
1935 statute prohibited as unfair are essentially unchanged. 49 By
the 1947 Act certain activities of labor organizations are declared unfair. 50 Provision is made for the negotiation of union security by a
union-shop agreement (whereby a thirty-day non-membership is permitted), if the Board first certifies that "at least a majority of the employees eligible to vote" (italic supplied) so authorize. 51 Before such
a union security election, however, an election must be held, as provided elsewhere, to determine the workers' bargaining agent; if the
union should fail to win the authorization vote, another election cannot
be held for one year. Under the prescribed rules those who fail to vote
are, in effect, voting "no." Where the possibility of employer domination (more subtle now than in the days of the Mohawk Valley form.ula) is present, such a situation might keep many from the polls. Apply this procedure to a public election and volcanic political possibilities
are apparent. To date, however, the response of workers to election
calls has been encouraging. Of fifty-eight collective bargaining elections conducted in October, 1947, presumably a representative month,
ninety-two percent of the 2,649 eligible employees exercised the voting
right. Incidentally, seventy percent of the valid votes were in favor
of collective bargaining representation. Of the thirty-one union-shop
authorization polls ninety-three percent voted, all but two percent favoring the union security. The net result of the voting provisions will
depend largely upon the result of other provisions.
Among the new unfair labor practices of employers is discrimination
by them against an employee who has been barred or ousted from union
membership for reasons not of catholic application or for reasons other
than non-payment of dues. 52 In the following sub-section, however,
it is specified that the union may establish the rules for "acquisition or
retention" of membership. If there is a conflict in these provisions it
will, very likely, first appear as regards expulsion and discharge of Communists, spies and strike-breakers. As the law stands, the refusal of
union men to work in the same plant with Communists is an unfair
labor practice. Of this situation the General Counsel has said, 58
Sec. 8.
Sec. 8 (a) (1), (2), (3).
50 Sec. 8 (b) (1)-(6).
48
49

51 Sec. 8 (a) (3).

52 Sec. 8 (b).
58 Remarks before St. Louis Bar Association, Nov. 3, 1947.
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".. . good or bad ...

it is the law and it must be administered as long

as it remains on the books in its present form." The section is not,
however, without substantial merit. For example if the employee is a
,colored man, in a union shop, where the bargaining union is one which
admits only white men, he would, nevertheless, keep his job. Perhaps
the most legitimate objection to the section lies in the fact many employments are such that a thirty-day period of non-membership is
sufficient to finish the job. General Counsel Denham has expressed
the belief, with regard to this section, that ". . . even failure to pay
assessments or fines levied by the union would not justify . . . discharge." 54

Other unfair labor practices by unions are listed as:
(1) Restraining or coercing an employee in the exercise of his nonmembership rights;
(2) To refuse to bargain collectively if the union is the employees'
majority representative;
(3) To engage in certain strikes and boycotts;
(4) To charge excessive or discriminatory initiation fees in a union
shop;
(5) To force the employer to pay for work not expected to be
performed.
Protection of the refusal of an employee to join the union is based
upon the theory that the union's advantages should be sold to him on
its merits and not as a matter of necessity. If an employee disapproves
of a strike, even if by a certified union, he is now free to return to
work. An analagous statute would be one allowing a citizen exemption
from taxes if he did not see the need for fire and police protection.
As explained by the General Counsel of the Board, the duty to bargain is ". . . mutual and both must honestly strive to accomplish a
meeting of the minds . . ." But nowhere is there a requirement that

any concessions must be made by either. The secondary boycott provision makes no distinction between those boycotts for justifiable cause
and those not for justifiable cause but provides a blanket prohibition.
This strikes a body blow at the very institution of unionism. Also forbidden as unfair is the jurisdictional strike, which is at root a friction
between industry unionism and craft unionism. There can be little
practical justification for such stoppages, and their end, like that of
the sit-down strike, will be little lamented. The final unfair practice,
featherbedding, is forcing an employer to pay for work which no one
expects to see performed. The prohibition of such a practice is justifiable on obvious moral grounds. Although featherbedding was not
without good reason in its origin, it had degenerated, in many instances,
S4
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to little less than extortion. Fortunately the restriction is only against
paying for services "not performed or not to be performed." Under an
interpretation viewing the intent of the statute'this section can only balance the scales of justice. Nothing indicates a purpose of depriving a
worker of his pay while "on call" or to regulate the number of employees on a job. The unfair practice consists of demanding pay "in
the nature of an exaction." Even the National Association of Manufacturers has been quoted as saying that it is "fairly clear" that
"....Congress, by using the words 'in the nature of an exaction', intended to reach only practices bordering on extortion ... 1
Perhaps the most clear and yet drastic, peacetime restriction on labor
lies in the specifying of a procedure for settlement where collective
bargaining has failed, disregard of which is an unfair practice. Briefly
the stipulations 55 are that modification or termination of existing contracts or working conditions is "unfair" unless: (a) sixty days notice
is given the employer; (b) an offer to meet for bargaining is made;
(c) within thirty days after the notice to the employer, like notice is
given to federal and state mediation services, and (d) the union refrain
from striking for sixty days after the first termination notice.
Following, in Title I, the enumeration of unfair labor practices by
workers and their representatives, there is provision for the determining
of those representatives, under the heading, "Representatives and Elections." Il By its stipulations the representation, as earlier noted, of
professional and other employees by the same unit is prohibited if the
voluntary consent of most of the former is not forthcoming. But as
regards representation of company property guards by a mixed union,
even their majority desire will not avoid the prohibition. An application of this section has already been made by the Board. Discretion
is delegated to the Board to decide whether the appropriate bargaining
unit shall be the employer unit, plant unit, or a subdivision thereof.
The day of nationwide bargaining has apparently not yet arrived.
Upon the filing of a petition for election, the Board will investigate and
hold hearings. The union seeking to gain representative recognition
must file an allegation of thirty percent of employee support, after
which, if substantiated, the Board will conduct a secret balloting and
will certify the results to all interested parties. Likewise a thirty percent opinion for rescinding of the union's bargaining certification will
be grounds for a new election. One of the effects of this section will
be to facilitate the separation of crafts from the prevailing industrywide bargaining unit. To lessen the chances of embezzling by union
officers and to control internal union business, it is required that a report, stating the names and compensation of all officers and of agents
earning over $5,000 annually, the manner of their election or appoint55 Sec. 8 (b) (6) d.
56 Sec. 9.
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ment, initiation fees and dues and almost every phase of activity, be
filed with the Secretary of Labor by each union and its national or
international affiliate before the Board may investigate its complaints.
In other words Congress has said in effect: "File these reports or function without the aid of the Board." If the union fails to file, the Board
is without power to process a petition for election of representatives or
to entertain a petition for union-shop referendum, from the union. In
its first ruling on the filing requirement 57 the Board ruled that a noncomplying intervening union could not even appear on the ballot in an
election sought by a complying union. Even where majority votes
had been obtained those failing of compliance were not certified. 58 The
reasons for compliance are compelling.
It is also ncessary, in order that the mechanism of the Board may
be utilized, that the officers of each union and of any "national or international labor organization of which it is an affiliate or constituent
unit

. ."

file affidavits disavowing belief or membership in, or support

of, the Communist party or similar revolutionary organizations. Criminal penalties attach for untruth. 59 Although this idea is not original,
having been adopted at Canadian government insistence by the Canadian Seamans Union, it at once aroused bitter opposition, including
much from quarters of unimpeachably democratic character. 60 The
immediate reluctance of labor leaders is as understandable as is their
reversal of opinion upon due consideration of the worthy purpose of
the affidavit. The executive boards of the great associations of unions,
the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations, since they usually require unanimity of action, were slower
to respond. A ruling by the General Counsel that all such officers must
sign the affidavit was, fortunately, overruled 61 by the Board which
noted that such associations are not "national or international" labor
organizations within the purview of the Act. As Senator Taft commented, this ruling was "certainly not in conflict with the intention of
Congress." These non-Communist affidavits having been judicially declared 6 2 constitutional as within the power of Congress to guarantee
republican form of government, and 19,306 having been filed by the
deadline, it would seem that their validity is established before the
courts and their acceptance by labor is general. However, one may
not say that further tests and strong opposition to the requirement of
affidavits will not be forthcoming. Although this is one of the few
truly worthy provisions of the statue, Senator Taft exhibits a lack of
understanding of human nature when he pontificates that, "the opposiR-11, N. L. R. B., Oct. 29, 1947.
R-21, N. L. R. B., Nov. 21, 1947.
Sec. 35A, Criml. Code.
60 The Labor Leader, Sept. 19, 1947. p. 1, col. S.
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R-7, N. L. R. B., Oct. 7, 1947.
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Oil Workers International Union v. Elliott, 13 Labor Cases 64,016, (1947).
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tion of union leaders to the filing of such affidavits raises a serious question in the good faith of their protests against Communist-controlled
unions." It would be better, as the late Mr. Joseph A. Padway, General Counsel of the American Federation of Labor, suggested, 63 for
Congress to eliminate Communist influence in unions by establishing
anti-Communist conditions for union membership.
The final section of Title I, of appreciable significance, is that deal64
ing with the prevention of the unfair labor practices aforementioned.
Although empowering the Board to prevent unfair practices, provision is
made for it to cede jurisdiction to any appropriate state agency operating under a statute with Title I, where the industry involved is primarily of a local character. Chairman Herzog of the Board expressed 65
his, ". . . hope that this can be accomplished without imposing Federal
policy too rigidly, lest we discourage 'the making of social experiments
. ..in the insulated compartments afforded by the several states';"
quoting Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Truax v. Corrigan.66 Under
the section in question the Board, before any hearing or trying of the
case, may pray an injunction. This discretion of the Board is relevant
to the practice of both employers and unions. A sub-section providing
for mandatory injunctions, as in a secondary boycott, applies only to
unions. By its terms the Act sets a six month statute of limitations for
the filing of a complaint resulting from an unfair practice. Should a
discharged employee be ordered reinstated, the union or the employer,
whichever was responsible for the discrimination, is liable for his lost
pay. One of the most profound changes in the entire Title I is that relating to evidence. 67 The norm of the Wagner Act, "upon all the evidence," is changed to the criterion of the "preponderance" of evidence.
The relation of the Act to the Administrative Procedure Act has been
noted before. The most pronounced regression in labor relations is
accomplished by the semi-abrogation of the Norris-La Guardia Act.
The restoration of the reign of the injunction seems now almost complete. True there is the saving clause that a preliminary injunction
"shall be effective for no longer than five days," but this is often enough
to break a legitimate effort by workers.68
To provide a starting mechanism for its Frankenstein, Title I prescribes investigatory powers for the Board. 69 Its sole deviation from
the 1935 model is a stipulation that subpoenas duces tecum may be
revoked after five days.
63 Address to A. F. L. convention at San Francisco, Oct. 8, 1947.
64
65

Sec. 10.
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257 U. S. 312, 344. 42 S. Ct. 124, 66 L. Ed. 254 (1921).
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Ironically, the "limitations" of Title I are that nothing shall be construed to limit or qualify the right to strike, "except as specifically provided for herein." 70 The customary saving clause of separability
against the judicial declaration of invalidity of a certain section, is provided and never more appropriately.
It is apparent from a study of Title I that there is little agreement,
even among its supporters, as to just what it commands. Obviously
there was a serious effort on the part of some to extend the processe5 of
collective bargaining and to eliminate certain union abuses. Perhaps,
to a degree, this latter goal will be reached. But the Taft-Hartley Act
unfortunately, is an omnibus bill in which the fare of many of the
riders was paid by those opposed to the basic idea of collective bargaining by free labor with free capital. This law is the product of haste
and undue compromise, concerned with a complex problem and providing only in the Act itself for a thorough study of the problem, a study
which should have preceded the action. The inevitable effect of this
mistake will be to seriously endanger the economic security of our
economy's most insecure citizen, the worker. There is the distinct possibility that the conflict envisaged by President Truman, in his veto
message, will occur. In part the President wrote:
This bill would go far toward weakening our trade union
movement. And it would go far toward destroying our national unity. By raising barriers between labor and management and by injecting political considerations into normal
economic decisions, it would invite them to gain their ends
through direct political action. I think it would be exceedingly dangerous to our country to develop a class basis for
political action.
The integrity and purpose of many of the statute's supporters is
above question but we must be alert ".

.

. that in striking at union

abuses we do not destroy the contribution which unions make to our
democratic strength." 71 The chief legal problem, the simultaneous
control and protection of labor, remains unsolved. As the General
Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has said,72 an effort
has been made "to coordinate two sets of rights and responsibilities."
Only judicial determination can finally judge the degree of the Act's
failure. The interpretation, necessarily preceding adjudication, will
be based, partially, upon the Congressional intent. What was this intent as regards Title I? The motive is unimportant. If the particular
provision is constitutional, only the legislative intent is determinative.
From a study of the debates 73 it appears that the compromise intent
was threefold: (1) to strengthen the bargaining position of capital by
70

Sec. 13.
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Veto message of President Truman, June 20, 1947.
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eliminating what was considered its handicap and by lessening the opportunity for large-scale collective bargaining by labor; (2) to control
union activities in their administration and expansion though increasing their civil liability and criminal responsibility and thus eliminating
certain of the more prevalent abuses; and (3) to institute governmental
control of the labor-management relationship by expanding the operational and jurisdictional scope of the Board and thus more certainly to
govern the results of bargaining.
The immediate reaction of organized labor, which had opposed passage of the bill, was militant, yet cautious. The legal departments are
advising the membership as to the possibilities of the Act. Some of
the Act's provisions 74 will almost certainly be declared unconstitutional
but there is little likelihood of such an occurrence within Title I, or,
extensively, in the other Titles. Therefore the unions are bargaining
for contract provisions: 75 (1) reserving always the right to strike (Senator Taft has indicated that such provisions do not violate the Act, but
his co-author Representative Hartley has disagreed); (2) that refusal
to work with non-union workers is not a breach; (3) that limit breach
responsibility to strikes either really caused or actually ratified by the
union; (4) limiting breach to exclude failure to cross picket lines, unless such violates the Act's "no boycott" provision; 76 (5) stipulating

liquidated damages for a breach and providing for an impartial arbiter;
and (6) delineating the actual authority of all "agents." Many new
contracts incorporating certain of these provisions are already in opera77
tion. They await court test.
Whether the Act is workable will soon appear. When most provisions of Title I became effective, August 22, 1947, there were 3,937
cases pending under the National Labor Relations Act; 78 this is one
indication of the scope of the problem. Without the cooperation of all
concerned Title I is likely to defeat its purpose because of the unique
problem with which it attempts to deal. As was said 79 by Chairman
72 Remarks of N. L. R. B. General Counsel Denham before St. Louis Bar
Association, Nov. 3, 1947.
78 Salient discussion and debates published in TBm NEw LABOR LAW, Bureau
of National Affairs.
74 Sec. 304, prohibiting certain union political expenditures.
A proposed
state law similar to the Act, was held repugnant by a state supreme court. Howe
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, ..
_ Mass .....
62 N. E. (2d) 115 (1946).
75 Bull. No. 4 by International Brotherhood of Teamsters, explaining the
Taft-Hartley Act.

76
77

Sec. 303 (a).

20 L. 'L. R. No. 121, Analysis 41, New Points of Law Raised by John L
Lewis Coal Contract.
78 Address of Paul M. Herzog, Chairman of the N. L. R. B., before the
American Management Association, Oct. 2, 1947.
79 Address of Paul M. Herzog, Chairman of the N. L. R. B., before the
American Management Association, Oct. 2, 1947.
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Herzog of the Board, "Man-made law can never serve as a substitute
for good labor relations." Or, as it was phrased by General Counsel
Denham, 80 "You simply cannot legislate labor-management agreements into existence." Organized labor, for obvious reasons, is not
prepared to operate under this statute any longer than necessary. Every
convention of workers since the Act became law has called for its repeal within the shortest possible time. 81 Representative of those who
will lead the fight for repeal is Senator Wagner, whose long-standing
principles were incorporated in the 1935 Act. 82 It is unlikely that the
Act will soon be repealed although major amendments cannot be long
in forthcoming.
This, then, is Title I of the Labor Management Relations Act, its
background, major amendments of the National Labor Relations Act
and the immediate reaction to it. This is the major portion of the
Taft-Hartley Act aimed at the total problem of this economic-social relationship. Although some of the abuses will be eliminated by this Act,
its chief effect will be to injure the efficacy of labor unions. To this
apparent dilemna, the pragmatist can offer no solution.
There is one school of philosophy which presents the only solution
which is conceivably consistent with our system of democracy. As a
group it has, through its spokesmen, condemned the Taft-Hartley Act
as an attempted solution because 83 "..
unduly curtailed . . ." by this 84 "1 ....

. basic prerogatives . . . were
measure of expediency . . .

[which] stands as a barrier to that mutual cooperation which should
be fostered between management and organized labor." The applied
teachings of this school are well stated by one of its leaders:
Those of us who condemn fascism and communism because they enslave the spirit of freemen, should be just as
ready to condemn a system which makes man the slave of a
machine. Machines-and that means factories, coal mines,
steel furnaces, etc.-xist "for" the workingman and not the
workingman for the machine. 85
This philosophy is that of the Catholic Church, which has 2,000 years
experience in ruling on the morality of practices by various social
80 Remarks of N. L. R. B. General Counsel Denham before the St. Louis
Bar Association, Nov. 3, 1947.
81 For Example, The Labor Leader, July 25, 1947, organ of The Association
of Catholic Trade Unionists.
82 Senator Wagner, whose N. L. R. A. did so much to implement Rerum
Novarum, is a recent convert to Catholicism.
83 The Labor Leader, Oct. 18, 1947, statement of Bishop James A. Griffin
of Springfield, Ill.
84 Bishop Charles F. Buddy of San Diego. Concurring; Bishop Bernard J.
Shiel of Chicago.
85 Bishop James A. Griffin, quoted in The Labor Leader, Oct. 18, 1947.
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groups 8 6 Upon such matters the Church has not only a right but a
duty to speak, since 87 ,,... the social and economic orders cannot be
divorced from the moral." What is the moral solution submitted by
the Church? In the encyclical "On The Reconstruction of the Social
Order" (1931) Pope Pius XI suggested that ". .. the wage contract
should, when possible, be modified somewhat by a contract of partnership.. ." to the end that "... wage-earners are made sharers in some
sort in the ownership, or the management, or the profits." Such a, program would go much farther in solving the basic problem than does the
Taft-Hartley Act. If, as democracy believes, man is essentially good
and correct in most of his decisions, then a solution will be found.
John E. Cosgrove

JUDICIAL REIEw-ErFECT OF THE ADmINISTATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT, SECTION 10.--Prior to the adoption of the Administrative Procedure Act 1 in 1946, the law was well settled that the right to judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies was governed exclusively by
specific legislation either expressly or impliedly granting or denying the
right in the case of each particular agency.2 The issue, whether or not
the legislation impliedly did grant the right to review, was a source of
much confusion and litigation; some kind of congressional action was
necessary. In a recent decision, 8 a district court said: "There is no
doubt that the Administrative Procedure Act reflected a deep-seated
dissatisfaction on the part of some towards the present operation of
administrative agencies." Just what the Act did to make certain when
review is to be granted, and what it did to the scope of review, are
questions being hotly contested in the courts today. The purpose of
this writing is to present the pertinent decisions and statements since
the enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act and to arrive at a
conclusion as to what the final outcome will be.
In a Report of the House Judiciary Committee it is stated:
To preclude judicial review under this bill, a statute, if
not specific in withholding such review, must upon its face
give clear and convincing evidence of an intent to withhold it.
86 THE ComrnoN or LABOR, Pope Leo XIII; RECONSTRuCn or P TE SOCIAL
ORDER, Pope Pius XI.

87 Address of Pope Pius XII to American Delegates to convention of the
International Labor Organization.
Pub. L. No. 404, 79th. Cong. 2nd. Sess. (1946) approved June 11, 1946.
2 Butte, A. & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 290 U. S. 127, 78 L. Ed. 222, 54
Sup. Ct. 108 (1933); American Federation of Labor v. N. L. R. B., 308 U. S.
401, 84 L. Ed. 347, 60 Sup. Ct. 300 (1940).
8 U. S. ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 72 F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Pa. 1947).
1
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The mere failure to provide specially by statute for judicial4
review is certainly no evidence of intent to withhold review.
Many courts undoubtedly will entertain jurisdiction to review decisions of administrative agencies on this ground. However, although
section 10 may give the courts a new basis for decision, it does not
alter the fact that a court in all likelihood could have rightly assumed
jurisdiction over these shadowland cases all along, as did the Supreme
Court two years before the Act. 5
It has been held that no change was effected in the law governing
deportation proceedings since review was precluded by the Act under
which the agency came into being and that only where no provision
affecting review is present in the legislation governing the particular
agency, does the Administrative Procedure Act have any bearing on
the question. 6
Another case, 7 involving the National Labor Relations Act, holds
that section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act is merely declaratory of existing law on judicial review; that it neither conferred jurisdiction upon the court above and beyond that which it already had,
nor granted to aggrieved parties any rights they did not have under
the Labor Relations Act.
Where an attempt was made to bring a case which was pending before the Federal Communications Commission into a federal court, it
was held that the established rule of exhausting administrative remedies must be followed before the federal court could take jurisdiction,
because there was provision for review in the Federal Communications
Act but that the Administrative Procedure Act, section 10, was not intended to enlarge the scope of judicial review in agency actions.8
A decision of the Tax Court came under review in a circuit court.9
The opinion contained dicta to the effect that section 10 had enlarged
the scope of review. The assumption of jurisdiction in this case was
founded on other grounds, however, and the court did not commit itself
as to how, when, or where its scope would be enlarged, and the dicta
were non-essential to the decision.
So far as it has been determined by decisions to date, the Administrative Procedure Act has not affected matters of procedure. On a motion
Sen. Doe. No. 248, 79th. Cong., 2nd. Sess. (1946) 275.
5 Stark et al. v. Wickard et al., 321 U. S. 288, 88 L. Ed. 733, 64 Sup. Ct. 559
(1944).
6 U. S. ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 72 F. Supp. 193 (E. D. Pa. 1947); United
States v. Watkins, 71 F. Supp. 429 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
7 Olin Industries v. N. L. R. B., 72 F. Supp. 225 (D. Mass. 1947).
8 Hearst Radio v. Federal Communications Comm., 73 F. Supp. 308 (D. C
1947).
9 Lincoln Electric v. Commission of Int. Rev., 162 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A.
6th, 1947).
4
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to change the place of hearing of a case pending before the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the circuit court said that no new power to
review procedural matters before final administrative determination was
granted by the Administrative Procedure Act.10 A district court held
that it had no power to grant interim relief by way of injunction prior
to the final determination of complainant's proceeding before the Secretary of Agriculture and that the Administrative Procedure Act did
not give it any new power in this respect.'
There remains the contention that the "substantial evidence" rule
in section 10(e) has enlarged the scope of review. The dictum in U. S.
ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins 12 is to the effect that whereas at one time
"any evidence" substantiating an administrative agency's decision was
sufficient to preclude reversal, today "substantial" evidence is necessary.
The usual case cited by the courts in holding "any evidence" used to
be enough is U. S. ex rel. Vajtauer v. Commissioner of Immigration.'s
Upon close examination of that and related cases, it appears that it was
based on what the courts are calling "substantial evidence" today, and
that the decision was an erroneous one. A leading case on the "substantial evidence" rule is cited as a basis for the section dealing with
evidence in the Administrative Procedure Act itself. 14 The Supreme
Court had repeatedly
held before the Act that "substantial evidence
5
was" necessary.'
In a statement before the Senate Committee 1 the Attorney General said: "Section 10 as to judicial review does not, in my view, make
any real changes in existing law. This section in general declares the
existing law concerning judicial review ...merely a restatement of existing law.. ." Although there is important comment 17 contrary to that
made by the Attorney General, the adjudicated cases since the Act are
in support of the latter. If the Supreme Court decides in accord with
the line of decisions in the lower courts, the Administrative Procedure
Act will need to be amended with stronger and more clear-cut directions to the courts if the apparent purpose of the Act is to be carried
out.
James K. Sugnet
10 See: Eastern Utilities v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 162 F. (2d)
385 (C. C. A. 1st, 1947).
11 Avon Dairy v. Eisaman, 69 F. Supp. 500 (N. D. Ohio 1946).
12 U. S. ex rel Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216 (S. D. N. Y. 1947).
13

273 U. S. 103, 106, 71 L. Ed. 560, 47 Sup. Ct. 302 (1927).

Consolidated Edison v. N. L. R. B., 305 U. S.197, 229, 83 L. Ed. 126,
59 Sup. Ct. 206 (1938).
15 Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U. S.135, 178, 89 L. Ed. 2103, 65 Sup. Ct. 1443
(1945).
16 Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th. Cong., 2nd. Sess. (1946) 415.
17 The Judicial Review Provisions of the Federal Administt'aiive Procedure
Act (Section 10) Background and Effect, John Dickinson, NEw YoRK SCHOOL OF
LAw INSTITUTE-PROCDMNGS, Vol. VII at p. 581.
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RAcIAL PESTRICTIVE COVENANTS.-Much

has been spoken and

written in the course of the past decade concerning democracy and the
American principles of liberty and equality. It will be the purpose of
this paper to examine a glaring defect which nevertheless persists in
American social life today: namely, the existence of racial restrictive
covenants. An examination of the law upon this subject will be followed by arguments which, if accepted, should lead to a complete repudiation of such prohibitive agreements.
To date, covenants or conditions in conveyances of real property, or
contracts for the sale of land, forbidding the occupancy of the land by,
or its subsequent conveyance to, persons of a certain race, color or religion or restricting its occupancy or ownership to persons of the Caucasian race, have generally been sustained by the courts.' The only
exception to this general doctrine has been in cases where covenants restricting subsequent sales of land have been considered a restraint upon
alienation. It might be noted, in passing, that a very recent case involving the eviction of twenty-five Negro tenants from a building was
upheld on the basis of a restrictive covenant even though the court
stated that it regarded such covenants as "illegal" and "un-American"
by their very nature.2 This action, which arose in the city of Chicago,
was the first Illinois decision on a restrictive covenant since the Supreme Court of that state upheld restrictive covenants more than ten
years ago. Being bound by previous rulings of the same court, the
judge felt unable to declare the racial covenant void and unconstitutional. Thus, in this case, stare decisis ruled over principle.
In the consideration of whether restrictive covenants or conditions
discriminating against persons on account of race, color, or religion
violate the rule forbidding restraint upon alienation, a tenuous and
seemingly illogical distinction has been drawn between a covenant or
condition which binds the grantee not to transfer or convey the property to certain classes of individuals and one which binds him not to
permit the property to be occupied by them. All courts thus far have
agreed that a condition or covenant that property shall not be occupied
by persons of certain races is not invalid as a restraint upon the alienation of the property, while there is no unanimity of opinion as to
whether or not the restrictions as to sale constitute a void restraint upon
alienation. 3
An expression of the legality of restrictive covenants is found in the
case of Hurd v. Hodge.4 The general rule is again given voice, but this
1 See Note, 114 A. L. R. 1237 (1938); See: Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S.
323, 46 Sup. Ct. 521, 70 L. Ed. 969 (1926).
2 Chicago Sun, Nov. 29, 1947, p. 2, col. 1.

3 See Note, 114 A. L. R. 1237 (1938); White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150
S. E. 531 (1929).
4 Hurd v. Hodge; Urciolo v. Same, 162 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. D. C. 1947).
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case is of special importance in that it will be heard in the immediate
future by the United States Supreme Court. That hearing will mark
the first time that the question of the constitutionality of restrictive
covenants will be presented squarely before the nation's highest court
of law. Additional interest is attached to this case since the Department of Justice is appearing in the case as amicus curiae to argue that
the enforcement of such covenants is contrary to the Constitution and
the laws of the United States. According to recent notice received
from the Solicitor General of the United States, the brief for the
government was in the process of preparation and was to be filed early
in December.
Popular opinion regarding one type of restrictive covenants was evidenced recently in Bannockburn Heights, a Maryland suburban area
adjacent to Washington, D. C. A newspaper account 5 reveals that in
this situation one Aaron Tuskin, an attorney of Jewish extraction, had
purchased a house, the deed to which contained a clause to the effect
that the property was never to be occupied by Negroes, Jews, Persians,
or Syrians. Public attention became focused on the subsequent developments when nine residents of the area sought to enforce the covenant through court action. Community resentment against the suit
mounted until it was dropped, and with it another opportunity which
might have been presented to the courts as a present day test of the
validiy of racial restrictive covenents.
To obtain an insight into the origins of racial restrictive covenants a
review of recent history would be of special benefit. According to Loren
Miller," the immediate circumstance that led to the creation and judicial
validation of racial restrictive agreements was the migration of Negroes toward cities, which migration began in the early years of the
first World War. These American citizens flocked to the urban centers
at the same time, and for the same reasons, that other Americans began to swell city populations. The net result was the development of
an acute housing shortage; Negroes began to overflow the formerlydefined Negro quarters and as they did they came into competition
with the home-seeking whites. To combat this migration, cities passed
racial zoning ordinances which later were held unconstitutional as violating the Fourteenth Amendment to our Federal Constitution. Present-day race restriction, then, had its origin in the neighborhood agreements embodied in "private contracts" so as to avoid the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Miller gives another
interesting comment on race covenants when he states that the classic
5 Newsweek, Vol. XXX, No. 13, Sept. 29, 1947, p. 29.
6 "Restrictive Covenants Yersus Democracy". an address by Loren Miller at
the Conference for the Elimination of Restrictive Covenants, held in Chicago, May
10-11, 1946, reported in Racial Restrictive Covenants, published by Chicago Council Against Racial and Religious Discrimination.
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case of wholesale residential segregation on the basis of race is the
reservation system for Indians which, while not altogether compulsory,
has served very well to limit Indian ownership of land except on these
reservations. He states that the common and vulgar justification for
this trend in American land policy is summed up in the phrase that
"this is a white man's country." Would too great foresight be required to see in this policy the same problems and the same troubles
that segregation in urban areas has fostered today?
Recognizing the background and the origins of the race covenants
which blot our economic and political life, it is easy to realize that today we are faced with the anomalous situation in which neither the
legislative nor executive branches of government may require or enforce
racial residential segregation, but in which another branch of government, the judiciary, may accomplish the same result through the pleasant fiction that when a judge issues an injunction restraining a citizen
from owning, using, or occupying his property, solely on the basis of
his race or color-violation of which may subject the offender to a jail
or prison sentence-his action is not state action at all, but only a
proper exercise of judicial power to enforce a private contract. Illogical,
perhaps, but true.
It need not be affirmed that the Constitution and the treaties of the
United States constitute the supreme law of the land which binds all
judges both federal and state,7 since such a statement is a truth of general acceptance and knowledge. By the Act of Chapultepec, s made in
conjunction with other nations of the Western Hemisphere, our government pledged itself to "prevent with all means in our power all that
may provoke discrimination among individuals because of racial or religious reasons." Does the enforcement of racial restrictive covenants
aid in the prevention of discrimination among individuals because of
racial reasons? If not, such enforcement is contrary to the supreme
law of our country and is therefore unconstitutional. A further example of an international committment to which our nation is a party
is given in the United Nations Charter. 9 Do covenants for race segregation promote ".

.

. universal respect for, and observance of human

rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race. .

..

"?

The current case of Hurd v. Hodge 10 is of a special value because
of the scholarly arguments advanced in the dissenting opinion of Justice Edgerton against the enforcement of racial covenants concerning
the use and sale of land. He argues that such agreements are un7

s
1945

U. S. CONST. Art. VI.
ACT or CHAPULTEPEC (March 1945) Dept. of State Bulletin, March 4, 9-

9 U. N. CHARTR Art 55c, 56.
10 162 F. (2d) 233, (C. C. A.

D. C. 1947).
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enforceable for five independent reasons. An examination of them reveals the following points: such covenants are void because they are
contrary to public policy; they are void as an unreasonable restraint on
alienation; they are void because forbidden by the Constitution; they
are void because they violate the Civil Rights Act; and they are void
because of principles of equity.
With reference to the first point, that of public policy, he says that
any contention that public welfare is promoted by preventing Negroes
from purchasing homes in white neighborhoods has been refuted as a
matter of law by Buchanan v. Warley.11 Since racial restrictive covenants are directed to the same end, it necessarily follows that they also
do not promote the general welfare. Enforced housing increases crowding, squalor, and prices in the areas where the Negroes are compelled
to live. The result is the destruction of home life, mounting juvenile
delinquency, and other indications of social pathology which are bound
to have their contagious influence upon adjoining white areas. 12
Examining the analysis of the American Law Institute' 3 in the field
of restraints on alienation and the factors which, if present, could make
such restraints reasonable and valid, Judge Edgerton finds that none of
the favorable factors can justify the enforcement of racial restrictive
covenants.
The arguments concerning unconstitutionality include the applicadon of the Fourteenth Amendment-specifically, the due process clause.
Justice Edgerton states that such covenants are in direct violation of
the clause which prevents state interference with property rights except by due process of law. Both this amendment and those statutes
enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and to entitle
a colored person to hold and to acquire property.
Upholding the restrictive covenants violates not only the due process clause but also the Civil Rights Act, which expressly provides that
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 14
A statute which declares or confers a right means, if it means anything,
that courts shall recognize and protect the right of all citizens, regardless of color. "The Constitution and the Civil Rights Act," says Justice Edgerton, "have foreclosed the matter. The right to buy and use
anything that whites may buy and use is conferred upon Negroes implicitly by the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend11 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct. 16,r 62 L. Ed. 149 (1916).
12 Gunnar Myrdal, AN A
iERcAx D.MMA.
THE NEGRO PROBrIm
MODEmR DEMocRAcy 626 (1944).
13 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY pp. 2379-80 (1944).

14 14 STAT. 27, J 1 (1866); RL S. § 1978; 8 U. S. C. A. § 42 (1942).
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ments and explicitly by the Civil Rights Act. Of the civil rights so
conferred, none is clearer and few are more vital than the right to buy
a home and live in it."
The fifth argument, and the final one, is based upon the familiar
principle of "balancing equities." Because of the present housing
shortage and overcrowding, the extreme hardship which enforcement of
the covenants through injunctions would bring, greatly outweighs the
benefits which the enforcement of the covenants would give the appellees.
Just how much force such legal arguments will have upon the decision of this case in the Supreme Court remains to be seen. If heeded,
they will bring a reversal of a long trend of decisions upholding racial
segregation. Coupled with additional factors, such as the following
statement made by the President of the United States, the tide may
well be turned:
More and more we are learning, and in no small measure
through the medium of the press, how closely our democracy
is under observation. We are learning what loud echoes both
our successes and our failures have in every comer of the
world. That is one of the pressing reasons why we cannot
afford failures. When we fail to live together in peace, the
failure touches not us, as Americans, alone, but the cause of
15
democracy itself. That we must never forget.
Furthermore, we have the duty to fulfill, in this class of actions, the
purpose of government as given in the Declaration of Independence:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights
....
That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among
men, . . ."

Beyond and above these arguments based upon our national law are
those touching the natural law. Recognizing the spiritual equality of
men and accepting the doctrine of the brotherhood of men, our democratic civilization must, of necessity, presuppose and admit of a prior
belief in the essential truth of the Fatherhood of God. This follows
since there can be no relationship of brotherhood that does not stem
from mutuality of fatherhood. "Men are brothers," states Bishop
Bernard J. Shell, "not because of some mystic unity growing out of
emotionalism, but because they proceed from a common originGod." 18 If men are to strip from the brotherhood of man the doctrine
of the Fatherhood of God, there is left but a meaningless husk. Bishop
15 Address made by President Truman upon presenting the Wendell Wikie
Awards for Journalism, Associated Press Release, Feb. 28, 1947.
16 "Restrictive Covenants versus Brotherhood", by the Most Rev. Bernard
J. Sheil, published in pamphlet cited supra, note 6.

